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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Daniel Edward Ehrlick appeals from his judgment of conviction for first-
degree murder. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
Ehrlick reported his girlfriend Melissa Jenkins' eight-year-old son, R.M., 
was missing, asserting R.M. failed to return from a birthday party while in 
Ehrlick's care. (See,~, Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 3156, L. 16 - p. 3162, L. 10; vol. II, 
p. 3331, L. 10 - p. 3343, L. 22.) An extensive search failed to find R.M., and also 
found no evidence supporting Ehrlick's claim R.M. had gone to a birthday party. 
(See,~. Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 2039, L. 12 - p. 2041, L. 2; p. 2290, L. 7 - p. 2293, 
L. 3; p. 2448, L. 13 - p. 2451, L. 2; p. 2481, L. 14 - p. 2482, L. 7.) In the ensuing 
days Ehrlick made many inconsistent statements regarding R.M.'s activities the 
day he was reported missing and showed little enthusiasm for trying to locate 
R.M. (Trial Tr., vol. I. p. 2065, L. 5 - p. 2066, L. 8; vol. II, p. 3366, L. 4 - p. 3367, 
L. 21; p. 3756, L. 2 - p. 3761, L. 23; p. 3777, Ls. 3-8; p. 3829, L. 4 - p. 3830, L. 
24; p. 3835, L. 24 - p. 3837, L. 14; p. 4166, L. 9 - p. 4173, L. 2; 4205, L. 8 - p. 
4211, L. 2; 4801, L. 9 - p. 4804, L. 21; 5421, Ls. 6-23.) 
Ten days later, R.M.'s corpse was found in a canal with rocks in his 
pockets to keep him under the water. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 1333, L. 22 - p. 1336, L. 
8; p. 1531, L. 23 - p. 1534, L. 1.) His body showed extensive injuries, including 
multiple injuries to his abdomen and his head that singularly or together caused 
his death. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 1539, L. 8 - p. 1575, L. 7.) Ehrlick admitted that he 
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had disciplined R.M. by making him assume a "dead bug" position (on his back 
on the floor with both arms and legs straight up) and may have caused bruises 
on R.M.'s back by putting his knees and weight on R.M. to make his stay still. 
(Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 1638, L. 12 - p. 1639, L. 4; p. 1699, L. 19 - p. 1722, L. 9; p. 
1739, Ls. 6-22.) A hole was found in a wall in Ehrlick and Jenkins' apartment 
consistent with having R.M.'s head smashed into it. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 1644, L. 4 
- p. 1645, L. 3; p. 1796, L. 11 - p. 1798, L. 22; vol. II, p. 3723, L. 7 - p. 3730, L. 
4.) In addition, the vomited remains of R.M.'s last meal were also found near the 
hole on the wall in Ehrlick's apartment. (Trial Tr., vol. I, vol. I, p. 1721, L. 19 - p. 
1722, L. 9; p. 1760, L. 7 -p. 1761, L. 2; p. 1846, L. 16-p. 1871, L. 16.) 
A grand jury indicted Ehrlick for first-degree murder and with failing to 
report the death of a child, with an enhancement for being a persistent violator. 
(R., pp. 24-27, 319-20, 448-50.) A petit jury found him guilty on both counts and 
the enhancement. (R., pp. 1240-43.) The district court entered judgment, 
sentencing Ehrlick to fixed life for murder and a consecutive fixed life sentence 
for failure to report a death with the persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp. 
1284-1287.) Ehrlick timely appealed from the entry of judgment. (R., pp. 1288-
93.) 
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ISSUES 
Ehrlick's statement of the issues (Appellant's brief, p. 14) is not 
reproduced here. The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Because the scope of the police investigation was an issue squarely 
raised at trial, has Ehrlick failed to show the district court abused its 
discretion by allowing Agent Martin to testify that reported sightings of 
R.M. alive on July 24 were investigated but determined to not be credible? 
2. The trial court allowed admission of a model of R.M.'s head to show its 
general size. Has Ehrlick failed to show that the district court abused its 
discretion because the model did not exactly match the measurements of 
R.M.'s head in all dimensions? 
3. Pursuant to I.RE. 404(b) and Idaho Supreme Court precedent, the trial 
court admitted evidence showing prior sadistic acts by Ehrlick to show his 
sadistic intent, motivation and lack of mistake or accident. Has Ehrlick 
failed to show that the evidence in question was irrelevant to such 
purposes or that the trial court abused its discretion in balancing the 
potential for unfair prejudice against the probative value of the evidence? 
4. The district court allowed the state to present evidence that Ehrlick had 
tried to manipulate his co-defendant into giving evidence favorable to him. 
Has Ehrlick failed to show that the district court abused its discretion to 
admit this evidence as showing consciousness of guilt? 
5. The district court allowed the state to present evidence that Ehrlick had 
attempted or faked an attempt to commit suicide in an effort to manipulate 
the co-defendant or the police investigation. Has Ehrlick failed to show 
that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the admission of 
this evidence? 
6. When Ehrlick first reported R.M. missing, he claimed R.M. had failed to 
return from a birthday party. People searching for R.M., however, found 
no evidence of a birthday party. As part of the evidence that no indication 
of a birthday party was found, the court allowed the state to ask whether 
the searchers encountered anyone who knew of a birthday party. Has 
Ehrlick failed to show an abuse of discretion in admitting evidence that 
persons contacted by those searching for R.M. knew nothing of any 
birthday party? 
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7. During the testimony of a detective, counsel for Ehrlick attempted to elicit 
testimony that a seven-year-old girl told the detective that other people 
had mentioned a birthday party that day. The district court sustained an 
objection that the evidence was offered for a hearsay purpose. Has 
Ehrlick failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
excluding this double-hearsay evidence? 
8. During direct examination Ehrlick testified that he was the primary 
caregiver for several children, including Jenkins' daughter, R.A. The trial 
court allowed the state to rebut this testimony with evidence that a custody 
order prohibited Ehrlick from taking care of R.A. Has Ehrlick failed to 
show the trial court abused its discretion by allowing this impeachment 
evidence? 
9. During closing arguments the prosecutor averred that Ehrlick had lied 
about several things, both in and out of court. Ehrlick objected, but the 
court did not sustain the objection. Because the prosecutor's assertions 
that Ehrlick had lied about several things was based on the evidence 
presented, has Ehrlick failed to show any error in the argument? 
10. Ehrlick asserts several claims of fundamental error in the closing 
argument: 
a. Has Ehrlick failed to show that arguing conclusions from evidence 
admitted without objection is misconduct where Ehrlick claims for 
the first time on appeal that the evidence was inadmissible? 
b. Has Ehrlick failed to show that the prosecutor's argument that 
Ehrlick's guilt was a reasonable inference from his admissions was 
fundamental error? 
c. Does Ehrlick's claim the prosecutor committed fundamental error 
by arguing a fact for which no evidence was admitted for the truth 
of the matter asserted fail because evidence of that fact was 
admitted at trial without limitation, and Ehrlick simply fails to 
reference the supporting evidence? 
11. Has Ehrlick failed to show cumulative error? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Testimony Of Agent Martin As To Why The Police Concluded That Sightings 
Of R.M. Alive On July 24 Were Not Credible Was Properly Admitted Because 
The Scope Of The Police Investigation Was An Issue Squarely Raised At Trial 
A. Introduction 
The Boise Police brought in FBI agent Mary Martin to assist with what 
was, at that time, a missing child case involving R.M. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 4434, L. 
13 - p. 4439, L. 2.) Her duty in the missing child case was to cover leads to 
determine "the last credible sighting" of R.M. (Trial Tr., vol. 11, p. 4439, Ls. 3-19.) 
Such a determination is important in a missing child case to start eliminating the 
various possible reasons the child might be missing. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 4437, 
Ls. 8-23.) 
Agent Martin testified she talked to several potential witnesses and 
reviewed statements of persons claiming to have seen R. M. on July 24, 2009, 
the day he was reported missing. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 4439, L. 20 - p. 4441, L. 
19.) After the defense objected on the ground of hearsay, the district court 
instructed the jury that Agent Martin was testifying as to her investigation, so any 
testimony as to statements was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. 
(Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 4441, L. 20- p. 4442, L. 24.) 
When the prosecution asked Agent Martin for her conclusion on whether 
all of the reported sightings of R.M. could be true, the defense objected on 
grounds of hearsay and relevance. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 4443, L. 4 - p. 4445, L. 
11.) The court overruled the objection. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 4445, L. 12.) Agent 
Martin testified that she did not believe "it was possible" that R.M. had been in all 
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the places people reported seeing him the day he was reported missing. (Trial 
Tr., vol. 11, p. 4445, Ls. 14-20.) 
Agent Martin next testified that many people reported what they had been 
told by others about seeing R.M., but she was unable to find the original sources 
for those reports. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 4445, L. 21 - p. 4449, L. 5.) Over a 
hearsay objection Agent Martin testified that she was unable to find "any 
information that supported" a report R.M. had been at a Jackson's convenience 
store that day. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 4449, L. 6 - p. 4450, L. 21.) 
Over objection that it was "for the jury to decide," Agent Martin testified 
(without revealing the substance of the statements) that seven-year-old K.D. had 
not provided a credible last sighting of R.M. because she provided statements 
that were inconsistent. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 4450, L. 23 - p. 4455, L. 6.) Agent 
Martin testified, over the same objection and again without revealing the 
substance of the statements, that O.J. and 1.T. had not provided credible last 
sightings due to inconsistent statements by them. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 4455, L. 7 
- p. 4457, L. 6.) She also testified that she concluded that reports R.M. had 
been to the pool that day were also not credible because her investigation led to 
the child who was actually at the pool. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 4457, L. 8 - p. 4460, 
L. 7.) 
Agent Martin then concluded her direct examination by testifying that none 
of the reported sightings of R.M. for July 24, 2009 were deemed credible after 
investigation. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 4460, Ls. 8-16.) 
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On appeal Ehrlick asserts the district court erred by overruling his 
objection that the "jury is the sole judge of credibility." (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-
21.) This argument fails because Martin's testimony did not assess the credibility 
of any testimony. Rather, it merely explained a stage of the investigation for a 
missing child that later turned into a homicide investigation. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of 
evidence and its decision to admit or exclude evidence will be reversed only 
when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Howard, 135 
Idaho 727, 721, 24 P.3d 44, 48 (2001); State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 112, 
106 P.3d 436, 438 (2005). 
C. Agent Martin's Testimony Was Not Admitted To Vouch For Any Witness's 
Lack Of Credibility But Rather To Establish The Thoroughness And 
Results Of The Police Investigation 
An expert's opinion is "admissible up to the point" where the expert 
"pass[es] upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight of disputed evidence," 
and is inadmissible if it "only vouches for the credibility of another witness." State 
v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, _, 301 P.3d 242, 257-58 (2013) (emphasis added). 
In addition, whether "the police could have made a more thorough investigation" 
is also a potentially relevant issue at trial. State v. Campbell, 104 Idaho 705, 
718, 662 P.2d 1149, 1162 (Ct. App. 1983). Because the thoroughness of a 
police investigation is relevant and admissible, see I.RE. 401 (evidence is 
relevant if it makes a fact at issue more or less likely), 402 (relevant evidence is 
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admissible), the district court properly admitted the testimony of Agent Martin 
regarding what potential leads she pursued and why she ultimately abandoned 
those leads in relation to the missing child investigation and concluded that R.M. 
had not been seen in public on July 24, 2009, the day he was reported missing. 
The thoroughness of the police investigation was a fact of consequence in 
this case. In opening statements defense counsel asserted that the police 
focused on Ehrlick and R.M.'s mother as suspects early, to the exclusion of other 
possibilities, and that focus skewed their investigation. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 1316, 
Ls. 9-23; p. 1318, Ls. 1-10 (government "resources" "ostensibly" marshaled to 
find R.M. were instead used "to accuse and convict").) Agent Martin's testimony 
went directly to this issue. 
Agent Martin testified to what investigative techniques are employed in 
missing child investigations. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 4434, L. 13 - p. 4437, L. 23.) 
She testified it was important to determine the last credible sighting of the child 
"and then move backwards from there" to determine if the child ran away, was 
abducted by a stranger, or the possibility of any of the myriad potential reasons 
the child went missing. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 4437, Ls. 11-23.) She then testified 
generally what investigation she undertook in this case to determine the last 
credible sighting of R.M. (Trial Tr., p. 4437, L. 24 - p. 4449, L. 5.) Specifically, 
she testified that investigation showed three potential last sightings of R.M., 
provided by K.D., O.J., and l.T., were not credible due to inconsistencies, and 
were therefore abandoned as leads in the investigation. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 
4450, L. 23 - p. 4460, L. 7.) She provided no details of what these last sightings 
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were or what specific inconsistencies caused her to abandon them as leads in 
the investigation. (Id.) Ultimately her investigation led her to conclude that there 
were no credible last sightings of R.M. on July 24, the date he was reported 
missing. (Trial Tr., p. 4460, Ls. 8-16.) 
Preliminarily, because neither K.D. nor 1.T. testified at trial, by definition 
Agent Martin's testimony did not "encroach[] upon the jury's vital and exclusive 
function to make credibility determinations" or "pass upon ... the weight of 
disputed evidence." Almaraz, 154 Idaho at _, 301 P.3d at 257 (quotations 
omitted). Testimony about the investigation of the potential leads provided by 
these persons, and why they were ultimately discarded, does not in any way fall 
within the objection asserted below or the argument made on appeal that Agent 
Martin's testimony encroached upon the jury's function of determining the 
credibility of K.D. or I.T. 
More importantly, Agent Martin's testimony was not offered to show the 
credibility of any witness or potential witness but to show the police response and 
thoroughness of the investigation of potential leads. O.J. did later testify at trial. 
(Trial Tr., vol. II, pp. 5700-5738.) The record, however, shows that Agent Martin 
did not testify about O.J.'s reported last sighting of R.M. in order to inadmissibly 
"vouch" for Jaber's lack of credibility. Rather, Agent Martin, like many of the 
officers involved in the case, testified to establish the thoroughness of the police 
investigation. The defense was certainly free to argue that O.J.'s testimony 
about seeing R.M. was credible and therefore the police were less than thorough 
for abandoning this lead on what happened to R.M. 
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Evidence having to do with the thoroughness of the investigation-
particularly pertaining to the defense claim that the investigation shifted from 
finding a lost child to suspecting Ehrlick based on predilections rather than 
adequate investigation-was admissible. Agent Martin's testimony related to 
why the investigation shifted away from the theory that R.M. disappeared July 
24th and shifted toward the theory he had died earlier that day. As such, it was 
admitted for this purpose, and did not "only vouch[]" for the credibility of 
witnesses. Ehrlick has failed to show error by the trial court in allowing 
admission of Agent Martin's testimony for the proper purpose of establishing that 
the police investigation was thorough and did not prematurely or improperly shift 
to Ehrlick as a suspect. 
D. Any Error In The Admission Of Agent Martin's Testimony Was Necessarily 
Harmless 
"Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected .... " I.R.E. 103(a). 
See also I.C.R. 52 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not 
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."). "The inquiry is whether, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the defendant] even 
without the admission of the challenged evidence." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 
664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 
24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)). The State has the 
burden of demonstrating that an objected-to, non-constitutional error is harmless 
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beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 
974 (2010). 
As noted above, Agent Martin could not be deemed to have testified about 
the credibility of two of the people Ehrlick claims were "witnesses" because 
neither K.D. nor I.T. testified at trial. Nor was Agent Martin's testimony that she 
concluded that the last sighting reported by O.J. was not credible and therefore 
abandoned as a lead ultimately unfairly prejudicial to Ehrlick because the jury 
had ample opportunity to review O.J.'s many inconsistent statements for 
themselves and make its own credibility determinations. (~, Trial Tr., p. 5700, 
L. 10 - p. 5738, L. 9; State's Exhibits 102-03.) Both O.J.'s credibility and the 
issue of whether police should have abandoned the lead he provided to them 
about R.M.'s whereabouts were before the jury to determine. There is no reason 
to believe in this case that the jury simply deferred to the agent rather than made 
its own credibility determination. 1 Thus, any error was necessarily harmless. 
In addition, the evidence against Ehrlick was very strong. The evidence 
showed that the remains of R.M.'s last meal of oatmeal and raisins were still in 
his stomach. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 1844, L. 10 - p. 1859, L. 21.) In addition, vomit 
containing oatmeal and raisins was found in the hallway by the hole in the wall in 
Ehrlick's apartment and on a floor steamer. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 1760, L. 7 - p. 
1 Ehrlick discusses the testimony of "M.R." and Jennifer Hastings in his section on 
harmless error. (Appellant's brief, p. 21.) He has failed to show from the record 
that these persons were ever specifically discussed in Agent Martin's testimony 
or were subject to any "vouching" objection by him at trial. Their testimony is 
irrelevant to the issue of harmless error because there is no claim that the trial 
court committed any error in relation to these witnesses. 
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1791, L. 11; p. 1859, L. 22 - p. 1872, L. 20; State's Exhibits 34-B1, 34-C1 
through 34-C30.) The state of digestion showed that R.M. had eaten the oatmeal 
much less than five hours before his death. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 1912, L. 7 - p. 
1931, L. 9; p. 1956, L. 18-p. 1957, L. 5; p.1997, L. 6-p.1998, L.14.) Ehrlick 
stated R.M. had eaten the oatmeal for lunch. (State's Exhibit 12-14T, p. 11, L. 20 
- p. 12, L. 8 (EhrlickEx.pdf at pp. 342-43).) This evidence thus showed that R.M. 
was dead before Ehrlick reported him missing and before the time Ehrlick 
claimed to have last seen R.M. alive. It also disproves Ehrlick's claim that R.M. 
was outside playing and puts R.M.'s death squarely in the time-frame he was in 
Ehrlick's exclusive control. Combined with evidence that Ehrlick told Jenkins 
they would have to "get their stories straight because the police are on their way 
over" (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 2041, L. 22 - p. 2043, L. 1) and the other evidence in 
this case, this court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt both that the jury 
would have concluded there were no credible sightings of R.M. alive the 
afternoon he died and would have found Ehrlick guilty had the challenged 
testimony by Agent Martin not been admitted. 
Given Ehrlick's opportunity to present any evidence of supposed sightings 
of R.M. the afternoon Ehrlick reported him missing; the fact he presented only 
some of that evidence; the fact that the evidence Ehrlick did present was 
thoroughly impeached; and the physical evidence that R.M. was already dead at 
the time Ehrlick claimed he was outside playing, the evidence of what leads were 
followed up on and eventually abandoned by the police, even if erroneously 
admitted, caused at best minimal potential unfair prejudice. This very slight 
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potential prejudice, if any, simply does not create reasonable doubt as to the 
verdict. 
11. 
The Model Of The Victim's Head Was Properly Admitted As An Exhibit 
A. Introduction 
Wesley Neville, a forensic artist with the FBI, and Robert Thomas, a visual 
expert specialist with the FBI, created a model of the "[a]pproximate size and 
shape" of R.M.'s head. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 2718, L. 17 - p. 2725, L. 4; p. 2736, L. 
11 - p. 2741, L. 2; p. 2758, L. 14 - p. 2770, L. 23; p. 2781, L. 20 - p. 2784, L. 
19.) The model was based on measurements performed by Robert Karinen, a 
forensic supervisor at the Ada County Coroner's office. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 2796, 
L. 11 - p. 2801, L. 24.) Karinen ultimately concluded that the model prepared by 
the FBI exactly matched his measurement of the length of the head, was .7 
centimeters shorter in width, and 3.5 centimeters smaller in circumference. (Trial 
Tr., vol. I, p. 2801, L. 25 - p. 2804, L. 8.) The district court ultimately admitted 
the exhibit with restrictions not relevant to this appeal. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 2940, 
L. 1 - p. 2942, L. 24; vol. II, p. 5586, L. 16- p. 5587, L. 19.) 
On appeal Ehrlick claims the exhibit was irrelevant, would not have 
assisted the jury, and was unduly prejudicial. (Appellant's brief, pp. 25-32.) 
These arguments fail because the model was relevant to show the location and 
relative size of R.M.'s injuries and that Ehrlick could have inflicted those injuries 
by striking R.M.'s head against a wall in Ehrlick's apartment with sufficient force 
to cause a hole generally matching the size of R.M.'s head. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
Relevance of evidence is reviewed de novo, but other questions of 
admissibility of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996); State v. Lamphere, 130 
Idaho 630, 632, 945 P.2d 1, 3 (1997). In reviewing the trial court's exercise of 
discretion, an appellate court determines whether the trial court: (1) correctly 
perceived the issue as one involving the exercise of discretion; (2) acted within 
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to specific choices it had; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason. State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37, 43 P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. App. 
2002) (citing State v. Powell, 125 Idaho 889, 891, 876 P.2d 587, 589 (1994)). 
C. The Model Was Relevant And Ehrlick's Appellate Argument Merely Goes 
To Weight 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401; State v. Hocker, 
115 Idaho 544, 768 P.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1989). "The use of dolls, models, and 
other types of illustrative evidence is within the discretion of the trial court." State 
v. Durst, 126 Idaho 140, 142, 879 P.2d 603, 605 (Ct. App. 1994) (prosecution 
used anatomically correct dolls in eliciting testimony from the victim). "Accuracy 
... is not the standard governing relevance of illustrative evidence .... " State v. 
Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008) (allowing video of 
various objects falling down stairs as illustrative of expert's testimony regarding 
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physics of child falling down stairs). Claims that the evidence is not sufficient to 
show the matter for which it is offered go to weight, not relevance. See State v. 
Glass, 146 Idaho 77, 81-82, 190 P.3d 896, 900-01 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. 
Christopherson, 108 Idaho 502, 504-05, 700 P.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(admission of defendant's knives of "similar description" to knife used in robbery 
"was proper"). Applying these same standards courts in other jurisdictions have 
held that models of a victim's head are admissible. .EJL_ State v. Rhodes, 627 
N.W.2d 74, 84 (Minn. 2001); State v. Shaw, 839 S.W.2d 30, 35 (Mo. App., E.D., 
Div 4 1992) (exhibits not "made to scale" admissible unless the jury would be 
misled). 
In this case the model of R.M.'s head was relevant to show the location 
and relative size of injuries to R.M.'s head and assist the jury in determining the 
mechanism of injury (specifically, whether R.M.'s head injuries resulted from his 
head being slammed against a wall, causing a hole). That the model reflected 
the general size of R.M.'s head instead of the precise size to the millimeter did 
not make it irrelevant for these purposes. The jury was fully informed that the 
model may have been a few centimeters off in two of three axes; the minor 
differences went only to the weight of the exhibit, not its relevance. 
Ehrlick argues that "because the model of the head was inaccurate, it 
could not assist the jury in determining the actual size of R.M.'s head." 
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(Appellant's brief, p. 26.2) The model was never admitted, however, to show the 
"actual" size of R.M.'s head, if by "actual" Ehrlick means "exact.'' For example, 
the state did not assert that the model was correct and the measurements by the 
coroner's office incorrect. The state always offered the model as an 
approximation that was accurate enough to allow certain comparisons, such as 
the size of injuries relative to the size of R.M.'s head, a comparison of R.M.'s 
head to a hole in a wall in the apartment where R.M. and Ehrlick lived, and the 
size of R.M.'s head to Ehrlick's head (to rebut Ehrlick's statement to a detective 
that R.M.'s head could not have caused the hole in the wall because it was 
bigger than Ehrlick's head). (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 2925, L. 25 - p. 2934, L. 24.) 
Ehrlick's arguments that the model was inaccurate ultimately go to weight, not 
relevance, given the purposes for which it was admitted. He has therefore failed 
to show error in the admission of the model.3 
2 In presenting his argument Ehrlick invites this Court to take judicial notice of a 
hat sizing chart and an infant head circumference chart his counsel found on the 
internet. (Appellant's brief, pp. 26-27.) His arguments based on these matters 
are improper and should be rejected for three reasons. First, the arguments are 
based on evidence not admitted before the district court and improperly 
submitted for the first time to the appellate court. Second, Ehrlick has failed to 
show that the measurements taken by the coroner's office are the same as those 
that would be taken by a haberdasher or a pediatrician, respectively. Finally, the 
state did not offer the model, and the court did not admit it, to prove R.M.'s hat 
size or percentile for head growth. 
3 Ehrlick also argues that the model was not "scientific" because it was not based 
on R.M.'s skull. (Appellant's brief, pp. 28-29.) Because neither Mr. Neville nor 
Mr. Thomas offered any scientific opinions this argument is irrelevant. Moreover, 
the claim that a forensic artist would render a more accurate model of the victim's 
head from his skull than from measurements and photographs of the victim's 
actual head is without any support in the record. 
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D. Expert Testimony Comparing The Head Model To The Hole In The Wall 
Was Not Required To Lay Adequate Foundation 
Ehrlick asserts the head model was improperly admitted in the absence of 
expert testimony on such matters as "force exerted, the dynamics of how a solid 
object affects drywall ... and so on." (Appellant's brief, pp. 29-31.) Although he 
cites the general standard for admission of experl testimony (Appellant's brief, p. 
29 ("Expert testimony is admissible if .... ")) he cites to no legal standard for when 
expert testimony is a foundational prerequisite to admissibility of a demonstrative 
exhibit. Because he has raised the latter and not the former, he has cited no 
legal authority relevant to the issue he raises. As such, this issue is not properly 
considered on appeal. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 
(1996). 
Even if the issue is considered, analysis under the correct legal standards 
shows no abuse of discretion by the district court. A party proffering an exhibit 
must authenticate it with "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter 
in question is what its proponent claims." State v. Simmons, 120 Idaho 672, 678, 
818 P.2d 787, 793 (Ct. App. 1991 ). "Generally, when a physical object is offered 
in evidence and a question of fact arises as to its connection with either the 
defendant or the crime, the object should be admitted for such weight and effect 
as the jury decides to give it, unless it is clearly irrelevant." kL. "Lack of positive 
identification [of the proposed exhibit] goes to weight, not admissibility." kL. 
Ehrlick's argument that expert opinion testimony is necessary to show that 
ramming R.M.'s head against the wall could have created the hole "goes less to 
the adequacy of the foundation for the evidence than to the sufficiency of the trial 
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evidence" to show the mechanism of injury. State v. Glass, 146 Idaho 77, 82, 
190 P.3d 896, 901 (Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting argument that state had to establish 
that Glass was person in chat before it could admit transcripts of chat). Here the 
foundation was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the model of R.M.'s head 
was what it was purported to be-a simulation of the approximate size of R.M.'s 
head, which allowed the jury to make certain comparisons. 
E. The Exhibit Was Not Unfairly Prejudicial 
Pursuant to l.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the 
district court's discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice-which is the tendency to 
suggest a decision on an improper basis-substantially outweighs the probative 
value of the evidence. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722 
(2010); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 907 (Ct. App. 1994); 
State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651, 656, 862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App. 1993). "Under 
the rule, the evidence is only excluded if the probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The rule suggests a strong 
preference for admissibility of relevant evidence." State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 
340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990) (emphasis in original). 
The only potential unfair prejudice identified by Ehrlick was that the jury 
may not have understood that the model was only a representation and may not 
have been perfectly accurate. (Appellant's brief, pp. 31-33.) Ehrlick's claim of 
prejudice is his same claim of irrelevance. Both should be rejected because 
evidence regarding the accuracy of the model was presented and fairly weighed 
by the jury. 
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F. Any Error In Admission Was Harmless 
The standards for harmless error analysis are set forth above. The only 
potential unfair prejudice identified by Ehrlick is that the jury might have 
disregarded evidence regarding the accuracy of the model. Because there is no 
reason to believe the jury disregarded evidence, there is no basis for any finding 
of prejudice. Moreover, because the state bore no burden of proving the exact 
mechanism of murder, State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 713, 215 P.3d 414, 
433 (2009) (where defendant both suffocated and poisoned victim state did not 
have to prove which was the mechanism of death), the jury was not required to 
specifically find that Ehrlick slammed R.M.'s head into the wall causing the hole 
(as opposed to slamming his head into any other stationary object or that he 
killed him by inflicting grievous compression injuries to his torso by dropping his 
knees onto R.M.), only that he caused R.M.'s death. As such, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the centimeters difference between the model and the 
measurements of the coroner's office was harmless. 
111. 
Ehrlick Has Shown No Error In The Admission Of Evidence Of Prior Acts Of 
Violence 
A. Introduction 
The state sought to introduce evidence of Ehrlick's prior bad acts for 
purposes other than propensity. (Sealed R., pp. 213-40, 284-303.) Ehrlick 
objected. (Sealed R., pp. 349-66.) The district court excluded most of the 
proffered evidence, but allowed the testimony of three witnesses: Misty Barnett, 
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Kelly Marshall, and Alexis Palmer. (Sealed R., pp. 398-410; R., pp. 836-37; Trial 
Tr., vol. I, p. 2809, L. 8 - p. 2833, L. 9; p. 2834, L. 4 - p. 2868, L. 19; p. 2869, L. 
11 - p. 2896, L. 11.) Ehrlick claims the district court erred by allowing this 
evidence. (Appellant's brief, pp 33-50.) Application of the correct legal 
standards to the record in this case, however, shows neither error nor abuse of 
discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Rulings under Rule 404(b), I.R.E., are reviewed under a bifurcated 
standard: whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity 
is given free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 
1185, 1187 (2009). 
C. Ehrlick Has Failed To Show Error In The Admission Of Evidence Pursuant 
To I.R.E. 404(b) 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible to prove the 
character of the defendant in an attempt to show that he or she committed the 
crime for which he or she stands trial. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188. 
However, such evidence is admissible for other purposes, including proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. I.R.E. 404(b); see also State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 845 
P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 87, 785 P.2d 647,651 (Ct. App. 
1989). Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible if (a) it is relevant to prove some 
20 
issue other than the defendant's character, and (b) its probative value for the 
proper purpose is not substantially outweighed by the probability of unfair 
prejudice. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 227, 230 (1999). The 
second prong of this test only excludes evidence if the danger of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs its probative value. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 
275-76, 77 P.3d 956, 964-65 (2003). 
1. The Testimony Was Admissible As Relevant To Matters Other 
Than Propensity, Including Intent To Torture, And Lack Of Mistake 
Or Accident 
"Rule 404(b) lists several permissible purposes" for prior bad acts 
evidence, "such as proof of motive, intent, plan, knowledge and identity, but this 
is not an exclusive list." State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496,501,988 P.2d 1170, 
1175 (1999). Proof of intent, in the context of torture murder, includes "intent to 
cause pain and suffering," "sadistic intent," and the "frame of mind of [the 
defendant] at the time of the commission of the acts directed toward the victim." 
State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho 163, 170, 715 P.2d 833, 840 (1986), abrogated on 
other grounds State v. Tribe, 123 Idaho 721, 852 P.2d 87 (1993). See also I.C. § 
18-4003(a) (making murder "perpetrated by ... torture" first-degree murder "when 
torture is inflicted with the intent to cause suffering ... or to satisfy some sadistic 
inclination"). The logic of admission of similar prior bad acts to show intent is: 
similar results do not usually occur through abnormal causes; and 
the recurrence of a similar result (here in the shape of an unlawful 
act) tends (increasingly with each instance) to negative accident or 
inadvertence or self-defense or good faith or other innocent mental 
state, and tends to establish (provisionally, at least, though not 
certainly) the presence of the normal, i.e., criminal, intent 
accompanying such an act; and the force of each additional 
instance will vary in each kind of offense according to the 
21 
probability that the act could be repeated, within a limited time and 
under given circumstances, with an innocent intent. 
2 Wigmore, Evidence, § 302, at p. 241 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1979) (quoted in 
People v. Carpenter, 935 P.2d 708, 746 (Ca. 1997) (evidence defendant shot 
and killed three other persons admissible to show intent when he shot the three 
victims)). 
This reasoning applies in this case. The three challenged witnesses 
testified that they had relationships with Ehrlick and cohabited with him. (Trial 
Tr., vol. I, p. 2810, L. 23 - p. 2811, L. 11; p. 2835, L. 12 - p. 2836, L. 23; p. 2872, 
L. 16 - p. 2874, L. 9; p. 2875, L. 25 - p. 2876 L. 11.) Ehrlick was violent, 
including choking and striking, and verbally abused them on an almost daily 
basis. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 2811, L. 14 - p. 2820, L. 4; p. 2837, L. 11 - p. 2840, L. 
12; p. 2843, L. 6 - p. 2844, L. 4; p. 2846, L. 3 - p. 2850, L. 8; p. 2875, Ls. 5-24; 
p. 2876, Ls. 12-21; p. 2879, L. 23 - p. 2880, L. 3; State's Exhibits 63-A through 
D.) On multiple occasions the women awoke from sleep because he started 
choking them while they slept. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 2821, L. 24 - p. 2822, L. 18; p. 
2842, L. 22 - p. 2843, L. 5.) He once tried to throw Kelly Marshall from a moving 
vehicle. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 2841, L. 12 - p. 2842, L. 9.) He would frequently lock 
them in a room or their apartment and refuse to let them leave. (Trial Tr., vol. I, 
p. 2820, Ls. 5-18; p. 2842, Ls. 10-21; p. 2844, L. 13 - p. 2846, L. 2.) Although he 
sometimes acted in anger (caused, for example, by another man looking at 
them), he was often violent for no reason. (Trial Tr., p. 2826, L. 25 - p. 2827, L. 
23; p. 2876, L. 22 - p. 2877, L. 17.) Ehrlick took pleasure in his abusive 
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behaviors toward these women. (Trial Tr., p. 2820, L. 20- p. 2821, L. 10; p. 
2840, L. 20-p. 2841, L. 2; p. 2850, Ls. 9-12; p. 2878, L. 3-p. 2879, L. 1.) 
This evidence was relevant to show intent to torture R.M. R.M.'s autopsy 
showed a severe and deadly brain injury caused by someone smashing his head 
against a hard, stationary object. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 1539, L. 8 - p. 1557, L. 10.) 
R.M. had also suffered a severe and deadly compression injury to his internal 
abdominal structure, causing a great deal of internal bleeding. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 
1557, L. 11 - p. 1569, L. 14; State's Exhibit 25-A-9.) R.M. had suffered from 
previous compression injuries to his abdomen and chest from the sudden 
application of force. (Trial Tr., p. 1569, L. 15 - p. 1573, L. 6.) Dr. Graben 
concluded the cause of R.M.'s death was "[b]lunt-force trauma to the head and 
torso due to an assault." (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 1573, Ls. 7-14.) R.M. would have 
suffered "[e]xtreme pain" before succumbing to his injuries. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 
1575, Ls. 5-7.) To show torture-murder the state had to prove that these injuries 
were "inflicted with the intent to cause suffering . . . or to satisfy some sadistic 
inclination." I.C. § 18-4003(a). 
Although Ehrlick generally denied having killed R.M., he did admit that 
some of R.M.'s injuries could have resulted from physical discipline he inflicted 
on the child. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 1699, L. 19 - p. 1722, L. 9; State's Exhibits 12-
20-A, 12-20-T, 39-41.) Indeed, Ehrlick's "discipline" of R.M. was a substantial 
issue at trial. (£.ll, Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 2505, L. 10 - p. 2530 L. 11; p. 2594, L. 13 
- p. 2637, L. 6.) "Evidence presented as to appellant's relationships with others 
close to him dispelled any possible conclusion that appellant's treatment of the 
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victim was solely for the purposes of discipline." Stuart, 110 Idaho at 169, 715 
P.2d at 839. As such, it was relevant. ~ at 169-70, 715 P.2d at 839-40. 
On appeal Ehrlick argues "the issue of intent was not challenged" by him. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 41.) This demonstrably false claim is later scaled back in 
the brief to a claim that his "defense was only that he did not commit the crimes 
charged, not that he did commit the crimes but with an innocent intent" and 
therefore "his intent was not squarely at issue in the same way as it was" in 
Stuart. (Appellant's brief, p. 42.) Ehrlick's argument fails because the relevancy 
standard does not require the fact tending to be established by the evidence to 
be "squarely at issue" but only that it be "of consequence." I.R.E. 401. Ehrlick's 
defense that he did not inflict the injuries causing death was not an admission 
that, if he did inflict the injuries to R.M., he did so with the intent to cause 
suffering or to satisfy some sadistic inclination. Ehrlick's defense did not relieve 
the state of the duty of proving the mental state element of its charge. Ehrlick's 
argument that it did is without any basis in fact or in law. See State v. Reid, 151 
Idaho 80, 86, 253 P.3d 754, 760 (2011) ("a prosecutor need not accept a 
defendant's stipulation to elements of the crime" and an offer to stipulate does 
not make evidence irrelevant). Because the state had the burden of proving 
Ehrlick tortured R.M. with the intent to cause suffering or to satisfy some sadistic 
inclination, evidence that Ehrlick had intentionally and sadistically inflicted pain 
upon others was relevant and admissible to show intent, motive, and lack of 
mistake or accident. 
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2. Ehrlick Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In Balancing 
The Probative Value Of The Evidence Against Its Potential For 
Unfair Prejudice 
Evidence of prior bad acts relevant to both bad character and a proper 
purpose such as intent is inadmissible only if the danger of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs its probative value. Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 275-76, 77 
P.3d at 964-65. This weighing process is "committed to the judge's sound 
discretion." State v. Buzzard, 110 Idaho 800, 802, 718 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Ct. 
App. 1986). 
The district court found the evidence in question "highly relevant" to prove 
intent and motive to physically dominate and control R.M., and that his actions 
were with sadistic intent; and further concluded that such relevance was "not 
outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice." (Sealed R., pp. 403-04; R., p. 837.) 
To minimize the chance of unfair prejudice the court also gave a limiting 
instruction. (R., p. 1212.) Finally, the district court excluded other proffered 
evidence as less relevant and unduly prejudicial. (R., pp. 406-09.) The judge 
understood her discretion and acted within the bounds of that discretion in 
weighing the potential for unfair prejudice. 
On appeal Ehrlick relies primarily upon the dissenting opinion in Stuart. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 48-49 (citing Stuart, 110 Idaho at 201, 715 P.2d at 871 
(Bistline, J., dissenting)).) The dissenting opinion stated that the facts of the 
crime in that case (also the torture murder of a child) would have engendered 
such prejudice against the defendant that any evidence of additional misconduct 
was automatically inadmissible. (Appellant's brief, pp. 48-49.) The analysis of 
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the dissent, however, has never been embraced by any opinion of any Idaho 
appellate court. The analysis that the horrendous nature of the crime itself 
should be considered unfairly prejudicial is, in fact, contrary to such precedent. 
See, ~' State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 819, 965 P.2d 174, 179 (1998) 
("unfairly prejudicial" evidence is that which "tends to suggest a decision on an 
improper basis"); State v. Herrera, 152 Idaho 24, 34, 266 P.3d 499, 509 (Ct. App. 
2011) ("Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it is damaging to a 
defendant's case; it is unfairly prejudicial when it suggests decision on an 
improper basis.") (citing State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 465, 235 P.3d 409, 
415 (Ct. App. 2010)). That the state presented evidence that Ehrlick committed a 
horrible crime is not unfairly prejudicial under existing law; Ehrlick's attempt to 
have this Court adopt the reasoning of the Stuart dissent and apparently reject 
long-standing and well-established law is without merit. 
D. Any Error In Admission Was Harmless 
The standards for harmless error analysis are set forth above. The jury 
must be presumed to have followed the trial court's curative instruction. State v. 
Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678, 690, 273 P.3d 1271, 1283 (2012). That presumption 
applies in this case because the trial court gave a curative instruction limiting the 
purposes for which the jury could consider the other crimes or wrongs evidence. 
(R., p. 1212.) Ehrlick's only rebuttal to this presumption is that the instruction 
was not given "contemporaneously" with the testimony and was "very general." 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 49-50.) However, the record shows that the prosecutor 
referenced the limiting instruction and argued the limited purpose of the evidence 
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in closing argument. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6338, L. 11 - p. 6339, L. 9.) There is no 
reason to believe that the jury did not follow the instruction under the facts of this 
case. Because Ehrlick has not rebutted the presumption, the error must be 
deemed harmless. 
IV. 
Evidence That Ehrlick Attempted To Procure False Evidence Was Properly 
Admitted As Showing His Consciousness Of Guilt 
A. Introduction 
The prosecution sought, by granting use immunity to overcome her 
invocation of her right against compelled self-incrimination, to procure the 
testimony of Melissa Jenkins, R.M.'s mother, regarding "some important 
admissions regarding R.M.'s physical condition on July 24, 2009" and "significant 
events that occurred within twenty-four hours preceding the reported 
disappearance" of R.M. (Sealed R., pp. 124-25.) Such information included that 
Ehrlick was alone with R.M. the night before; that Ehrlick was angry with and had 
punished R.M. that night; and that R.M. displayed symptoms of physical injury 
the morning he disappeared. (Sealed R., pp. 125-26.) 
Shortly after the state filed its motion to procure Melissa Jenkins' 
testimony, Ehrlick attempted to contact her through his cousin. (Sealed R., p. 
183.) Specifically, Ehrlick accused Jenkins of lying about him; stated that her 
statements hurt him, that her statements cost him "part of [his] Heart and soal 
[verbatim]," and that because of those statements, in part, he had "lost [his] will to 
live"; told her that she knows that the only thing he cared about was "the Kids 
[sic]," told her he was never abusive to her or "the Kids [sic]," and it was "really 
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sad" that she "believed all the Bullshit and all the Lies the cop's fed [her] 
[verbatim]"; accused her of stealing his property; and, finally, told Jenkins that her 
family is "stabbing [her] in the back." (Sealed R., pp. 183-86, 195-96.) 
The attempt through the cousin was not Ehrlick's first attempt to persuade 
Jenkins not to give information to the state implicating him in R.M.'s death. After 
police confronted Ehrlick with statements Jenkins made in her interview, Ehrlick 
left repeated messages on Jenkins' cell phone denying having harmed R.M., 
telling her that he loved her, and expressing sorrow that "[she] would do this to 
[him]." (Sealed R., pp. 186-88.) 
The state filed a motion in limine seeking a ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence that Ehrlick sought to dissuade Jenkins from giving incriminating 
evidence to the state. (Sealed R., pp. 181-96.) Ehrlick objected, contending that 
he "believes the letter and phone calls do not even rise to the level of relevance 
in this case because of their equivocal nature." (Sealed R., p. 360.) The district 
court found that because Ehrlick "does not make an explicit attempt to influence 
Jenkins," the communications could be "construed" as either "an attempt to 
influence a witness" or "an innocent man trying to clear himself." (Sealed R., pp. 
409-10.) The district court allowed admission of the evidence. (Id.) 
On appeal Ehrlick contends that the applicable law "suggests" that for 
evidence of attempts to influence witnesses to give favorable testimony or 
withhold unfavorable testimony to be admissible "the most reasonable 
interpretation must show consciousness of guilt." (Appellant's brief, p. 54.) The 
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standard Ehrlick "suggests" is directly contrary to the applicable law. He has 
therefore failed to show error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard for review of rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) is set forth in 
section II1.B., above. 
C. The "Most Reasonable Interpretation" Standard Proposed By Ehrlick Is 
Directly Contrary To The Rules Of Evidence That Make Weight Of The 
Evidence A Matter Exclusively For The Jury 
"Evidence of a defendant's efforts to influence or affect evidence, such as 
intimidating a witness, offering to compensate a witness, and fabrication, 
destruction or concealment of evidence may be relevant to demonstrate 
consciousness of guilt." Pokorney, 149 Idaho at 463, 235 P.3d at 413 (letter to 
son to convince him that Pokorney's conviction for lewd conduct would be 
detrimental to the family relevant to consciousness of guilt); see also Sheahan, 
139 Idaho at 279, 77 P.3d at 968 (evidence Sheahan removed bags placed on 
his hands to potentially preserve gunshot residue evidence admissible); State v. 
Rolfe, 92 Idaho 467, 470, 444 P.2d 428, 431 (1968) (evidence of defendant's 
offer to pay witness for false testimony admissible). "Moreover, while there may 
be an innocent explanation for such action, the alternative explanation generally 
goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of such evidence." Pokorney, 149 Idaho 
at 463,235 P.3d at 413. 
The test for relevance is whether the evidence has "any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination more 
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probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401. 
This inquiry is a question of law, not of fact, reviewed de nova. Grist, 147 Idaho 
at 51, 205 P.3d at 1187. Although a judge determines relevance, it is the jury 
that determines what weight or significance to give the evidence. !;JL State v. 
Knoll, 110 Idaho 678, 684, 718 P.2d 589, 595 (Ct. App. 1986). 
It is undisputed that Ehrlick's communications and attempted 
communications with Jenkins could have had the effect of making Jenkins less 
likely to cooperate with police or provide evidence of Ehrlick's guilt. The only 
question was whether Ehrlick's motivation was to prevent the disclosure of 
incriminating truthful evidence to avoid discovery of his guilt or to prevent Jenkins 
from providing false information tending to incriminate him. (Sealed R., p. 409 
(Ehrlick's actions were either "an attempt to influence a witness" or "an innocent 
man trying to clear himself'); see Appellant's brief, pp. 53-54 (asserting the 
second potential meaning of the evidence is "most reasonable interpretation").) 
That motivation, in turn, must generally be inferred from the doing of the act. See 
State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 573, 181 P.3d 496, 499 (Ct. App. 2007). That 
the evidence could be interpreted (having any tendency) to show Ehrlick knew 
he was guilty and was trying to either deprive the state of incriminating evidence 
or procure untruthful exculpatory evidence makes it relevant as a matter of law. 
The dispute as to the interpretation of the evidence-what weight to give the 
evidence-was a matter for the jury. Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 279, 77 P.3d at 968; 
Pokorney. 149 Idaho at 463, 235 P.3d at 413. Because the evidence had a 
tendency to show that Ehrlick was trying to intimidate or manipulate Jenkins into 
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sticking with a concocted story tending to exculpate him, rather than provide the 
true story that tended to incriminate him, the evidence is relevant as a matter of 
law. 
Even if relevant, evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." I.RE. 403. Unfair 
prejudice is the tendency of the evidence to "suggest a decision on an improper 
basis." State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 819, 965 P.2d 174, 179 (1998). The 
danger of unfair prejudice within the scope of I.RE. 404(b) is the tendency of the 
evidence to "prove the character of a person in order to show that the person 
acted in conformity therewith." Ehrlick claims the evidence was prejudicial 
because the "tone" of his statements portrays him "in an unfavorable light, 
showing a personality and style that is inherently unlikeable." (Appellant's brief, 
p. 55.) Ehrlick identifies no act in conformity with character that the disputed 
evidence tends to prove. Proving that he was "unlikeable" does not in any way 
demonstrate that he is more likely to have committed murder. Ehrlick has 
therefore failed to even articulate an unfair prejudice cognizable under Rule 
404(b). 
To the extent that evidence Ehrlick has an "unlikeable" "personality and 
style." can be characterized as proving Ehrlick's character "in order to show that 
the person acted in conformity therewith," Ehrlick has failed to show an abuse of 
discretion. Although Ehrlick's effort to emotionally blackmail and coerce Jenkins 
into sticking with their story rather than telling the truth certainly does put him in a 
bad light, it is difficult to see (and it is not articulated by Ehrlick on appeal) how 
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this is unfairly prejudicial in the sense of tending to encourage a decision on an 
improper basis. Evidence that Ehrlick tortured a child to death tends to make him 
unlikeable too, yet such evidence is not unfairly prejudicial. Evidence that Ehrlick 
tried to emotionally or otherwise coerce Jenkins into not refuting their concocted 
version of events is not unfairly prejudicial, and the district court did not err in 
concluding that any potential for unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh its 
probative value.4 
V. 
Ehrlick Has Shown No Error In The Admission Of Evidence Of His Suicide 
Attempt 
A. Introduction 
After being confronted by Jenkins' statements tending to indicate that he 
had in fact abused R.M. to death, Ehrlick admitted to police he lied about not 
using corporal punishment on R.M. and promised to return the next day and tell 
the "truth" about what happened to R.M. (R., pp. 807-08; Sealed R., pp. 414-15.) 
That night he tried to contact Jenkins about her statements. (Sealed R., pp. 414-
15.) He also learned police had executed a search warrant at his house. (R., p. 
808.) He then drank alcohol and apparently took 80 Lorazepam pills. (R., p. 
808.) The next morning he was found semi-incoherent and ultimately taken to a 
hospital. (Id.) Shortly thereafter he wrote a letter to Jenkins telling her that 
4 The legal standards for harmless error are set forth above. The potential for the 
jury concluding that Ehrlick had an unpleasant personality from this evidence, as 
opposed to evidence that he tortured a child to death, is so negligible as to be 
nonexistent. Beyond a reasonable doubt this evidence did not unfairly influence 
the jury's verdict. 
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because she was lying about him he had "lost [his} will to live." (Sealed R., p. 
196.) 
The state contended the evidence tended to show that Ehrlick had faked 
taking the drugs and also faked the symptoms the next morning as a diversionary 
tactic Ehrlick employed to slow or thwart the police investigation, including by 
trying to manipulate Jenkins from providing any evidence of his guilt or that R.M. 
was already known to them to be dead. (R., pp. 413-23.) The evidence was 
thus admissible to show consciousness of guilt, knowledge that R.M. was dead, 
and Ehrlick's general and specific intent. (Id.) 
The district court first found: 
The jury could reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence 
that Ehrlick attempted suicide and that this attempt was a 
diversionary tactic used by Ehrlick to draw attention away from him 
and to slow or thwart police investigation as well as creating 
additional delays in the reporting of the death of [R.M.J. 
(R., p. 809.) The court also found the evidence "relevant to Ehrlick's state of 
mind and intent," his awareness of facts unknown to the police (that R.M. was 
already dead), and "consciousness of guilt." (R., pp. 809-10.) Finally, although 
the relevance was "limited," "the danger of unfair prejudice [did} not substantially 
outweigh its probative value." (R., p. 809.) 
On appeal Ehrlick claims that the evidence could not support a finding that 
Ehrlick attempted an actual or fake suicide (Appellant's brief, pp. 58-59), that 
because there was no attempted actual or fake suicide the evidence was 
irrelevant (Appellant's brief, pp. 59-65), and that the district court abused its 
discretion in weighing the potential for unfair prejudice against the probative 
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value of the evidence (Appellant's brief, pp. 65-66). These arguments fail 
because a jury could conclude that Ehrlick took or faked taking 80 Lorazepam, 
mixed with alcohol, in either an effort to kill himself or appear to be trying to take 
his own life in an effort to manipulate the police investigation, especially by 
manipulating Jenkins from providing incriminating evidence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard for review of rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) is set forth in 
section I11.B., above. 
C. Evidence That Ehrlick Took Or Staged Taking 80 Lorazepam Pills With 
Alcohol Was Relevant To Show An Effort To Manipulate The Police 
Investigation Including Discouraging Jenkins From Cooperation 
"The trial court's factual findings regarding the foundation necessary for 
evidence to be admitted will be sustained if they are based upon substantial 
although conflicting evidence." Bahmiller v. Bahmiller, 145 Idaho 517, 521, 181 
P.3d 443, 447 (2008). In making a determination related to foundation, "the trial 
court is the arbiter of conflicting evidence." State v. Smith, 130 Idaho 759, 762, 
947 P.2d 1007, 1010 (1997). The evidence showed that Ehrlick, after learning 
that Jenkins had made statements to the police indicating that Ehrlick had in fact 
been abusing R.M. and may have injured him, spent the evening trying to contact 
Jenkins and drinking, and then either took or faked taking 80 Lorazepam pills, 
about 27 times the prescribed dosage. (Sealed R., pp. 414-16.) The next 
morning Jenkins' sister found he was difficult to wake up and he seemed semi-
comatose (or he intermittently faked such symptoms). (Sealed R., pp. 416-17.) 
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Shortly thereafter Ehrlick wrote Jenkins a letter telling her that her lies had cost 
him the will to live. (Sealed R., p. 196.) The evidence supports the inference 
that Ehrlick had made either a genuine or feigned attempt to take his life in order 
to manipulate Jenkins or otherwise interfere with the police learning that he and 
Jenkins knew R.M. was dead as the result of actions by Ehrlick. It thus had a 
"tendency" to make a "fact of consequence" more probable. I.R.E. 401. 
Ehrlick argues that the inference he eithe~ tried to commit suicide or faked 
trying to commit suicide to influence the police investigation cannot be drawn 
because (1) he denied attempting suicide (Appellant's brief, p. 58); (2) medical 
professionals did not believe his life was at risk or that any medical intervention 
regarding poisoning or overdose was necessary (Appellant's brief, pp. 58-59); (3) 
the person who found him semi-comatose the next morning (Jenkins' sister) was 
not so concerned that she called an ambulance or took him straight to the 
hospital (Appellant's brief, pp. 59-60); (4) police officers contacted by Jenkins' 
sister did not advise her to immediately take Ehrlick to a hospital (Appellant's 
brief, p. 60); and (5) Ehrlick was not so affected that he could not answer 
questions or walk (Id.). Ehrlick "asserts that it was reasonable to believe that he 
was exhausted, had taken his prescribed medications and, with the assistance of 
the medication, was finally sleeping, and remained sleepy until the medication 
wore off .... " (Appellant's brief, p. 60.) Even assuming it was "reasonable" to 
believe that Ehrlick took or faked taking about 27 times the dosage of his 
prescription medication merely to get a good night's sleep, Ehrlick's argument 
amounts to no more than a claim there are conflicting interpretations of the 
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evidence. Evidence is relevant, however, if it has "any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable." I. R. E. 401. Ehrlick's argument, based on some standard other 
than the applicable one, does not call into question the relevance of the 
evidence. 
D. Ehrlick Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
In Weighing The Probative Value Of The Evidence Against Its Potential 
For Unfair Preiudice 
Ehrlick argues that the evidence was prejudicial because it would show "a 
possible substance abuse issue." (Appellant's brief, pp. 65-66.) A single incident 
of taking or pretending to take 27 times the prescribed dosage of a medication 
does not show a "substance abuse issue"; it shows a suicide issue. To the 
extent the evidence could be construed as showing a "substance abuse issue," 
Ehrlick has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
concluding that this possibility did not substantially outweigh the probative value 
of the evidence. See Ruiz, 150 Idaho at 471, 248 P.3dat 722. 
E. Admission Of The Evidence Did Not Violate Ehrlick's Right Against 
Compelled Self-Incrimination 
"No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself .... " U.S. Const. amend. V. It violates the defendant's rights to 
use evidence of an invocation of this right as evidence of guilt. Doyle v. Ohio, 
462 U.S. 610 (1976). The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not 
self-executing, however, but must be affirmatively invoked. Minnesota v. 
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427-29 (1984); Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 
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559 (1980).5 Although "no ritualistic formula is necessary in order to invoke the 
privilege" against compelled self-incrimination, "a witness does not do so by 
simply standing mute." Salinas, 133 S.Ct. at 2178 (internal quotations and 
citation omitted). 
Under the facts of this case, Ehrlick promised to return to the police station 
and provide further statements the next day. That night, however, he either took 
80 Lorazepam pills, mixed with alcohol, or faked taking the pills and feigned 
symptoms of a drug overdose, and ended up in the hospital. Although this turn 
of events meant he did not keep his appointment, there is no reasonable 
interpretation of the evidence showing an affirmative invocation of his right 
against compelled self-incrimination. Taking (or faking having taken) 80 pills was 
not an invocation of the right to silence. As such, Ehrlick's Fifth Amendment 
rights were not even implicated. 
Ehrlick argues his Fifth Amendment rights were violated because it would 
"persuade the jury to infer guilt from Mr. Ehrlick's failure to speak with police 
regarding the disappearance of R.M." (Appellant's brief, p. 63.) It is not a 
violation of Ehrlick's Fifth Amendment right to present evidence he failed to keep 
an appointment with the police because he was in the hospital; rather, that right 
is violated if the state attempts to infer guilt from an affirmative invocation of the 
5 The United States Supreme Court has recognized only two exceptions to this 
rule requiring affirmative invocation of the right: "a criminal defendant need not 
take the stand and assert the privilege at his own trial" and "a witness' failure to 
invoke the privilege must be excused where governmental coercion makes his 
forfeiture of the right involuntary." Salinas v. Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2174, 2179-80 
(2013). Neither of these exceptions applies to the issue raised on appeal. 
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right to silence. As noted, however, there is no reasonable inference of guilt from 
invocation of his Fifth Amendment right because no Fifth Amendment right was 
invoked. The district court did not err in concluding that the state could use the 
evidence of the actual or fake suicide attempt as evidence because attempting or 
faking suicide was not an invocation of the right to silence, and therefore no 
inference of guilt could arise out of an invocation of that right. 6 
VI. 
Ehrlick Has Shown No Error In The Admission Of Evidence That People 
Searching For R.M. Found No Evidence Of The Birthday Party Ehrlick Initially 
Claimed He Had Attended 
A. Introduction 
Ehrlick originally claimed that R.M. had gone to a birthday party that he 
failed to return from. (See,~. Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 3156, L. 16 - p. 3162, L. 10; 
vol. II, p. 3331, L. 10 - p. 3343, L. 22.) The state presented many witnesses 
demonstrating that no such party happened. (See, ~. Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 2539, 
L. 7- p. 2542, L. 19; vol. II, p. 3388, L. 2- p. 3390, L. 1; p. 3498, L. 19- p. 
3500, L. 12; p. 3506, Ls. 5-20; p. 3641, L. 8 - p. 3645, L. 17; p. 3916, L. 2 - p. 
3917, L. 2; p. 4154, L. 19 - p. 4158, L. 12; p. 4192, L. 12 - p. 4193, L. 14.) 
Several of the witnesses testified that part of their search for R.M. included 
asking others about the reported birthday party. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 2542, Ls. 1-
6 The error associated with the admission of the evidence in question was, at 
best, harmless. Because there is no reasonable possibility that the jury 
concluded that the evidence showed a substance abuse problem or an 
invocation of the right to silence indicating guilt, which then caused them to 
render a verdict on either of these improper bases, there was, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, no prejudice. 
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19 (David Ehrlick); vol. II, p. 3388, L. 9 - p. 3390, L. 1 (Guy McKean); p. 3498, L. 
10- p. 3500, L. 12 (Samantha Burnett); p. 3506, Ls. 5-20 (Samantha Burnett); p. 
3644, L. 21 - p. 3645, L. 17 (Pamela Duncan); p. 3916, L. 15 - p. 3917, L. 5 
(Officer Deidre Harr); p. 4156, Ls. 2-11 (Pamela Anderson); p. 4192, L. 23 - p. 
4193, L. 14 (Pamela Anderson).) On appeal, Ehrlick challenges the testimony of 
only one of those witnesses, Samantha Burnett, claiming that her testimony was 
inadmissible hearsay. (Appellant's brief, pp. 67-72 (citing Trial Tr., vol. II, pp. 
3490-3500).) Application of the relevant law to the record shows no error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"A trial court's decision to admit or exclude hearsay evidence will not be 
overturned absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion." Burgess v. Salmon 
River Canal Co, Ltd., 127 Idaho 565, 574, 903 P.2d 730, 739 (1995). 
C. The Testimony In Question Was Not Hearsay 
Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted." I.R.E. 801(c). Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible. 
I.R.E. 802. The question that drew the hearsay objection was, "And during the 
time that you were out searching, did you come across anyone who knew 
anything about a birthday party?" (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 3499, Ls. 23-25 (question); 
see also Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 3500, Ls. 1-2 (objection to hearsay and leading).) 
The answer to this question was, "No." (Trial Tr., vol. 11, p. 3500, Ls. 8-12.) The 
matter asserted was that the witness-while trying to find R.M., who was 
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reported by Ehrlick to have failed to return from a birthday party-did not 
encounter anyone who had information about a birthday party the evening R.M. 
was reported missing. That assertion was made in court by the declarant 
witness. Ehrlick has failed to show that the testimony he objected to on hearsay 
grounds was actually hearsay, much less inadmissible. 
Even if error, any such error was harmless because several other 
witnesses testified, without objection, that they, too, talked to others in the 
apartment complex and adjacent trailer park and found no one with information 
about a birthday party. 
D. Testimony That The Story That R.M. Had Gone To A Birthday Party Did 
Not "Make Sense" In Light Of Other Information Known Was Not 
Erroneously Admitted 
The prosecutor asked a witness who had participated in the search for 
R.M. whether what she learned while searching caused her to "personally 
question the birthday party story." (Trial Tr., p. 3500, Ls. 13-15.) Defense 
counsel posited an objection based on relevance, which the district court 
overruled. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 3500, Ls. 16-18.) The prosecutor then asked, 
"Why?" (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 3500, L. 20.) The relevance objection was renewed, 
and an additional objection that the question called for an inadmissible expert 
opinion was made. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 3500, L. 21 - p. 3502, L. 20.) The district 
court ultimately overruled the objection. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 3505, Ls. 16-17.) 
The following exchange then occurred: 
[Q.] Based on the information that you received that night, 
did the story that you were hearing about the child going to a 
birthday party make any sense to you? 
40 
A. No, it did not. 
Q. Why not? 
A. It was 10 o'clock at night. There were no signs of a 
birthday party. I know with so many kids in that 
neighborhood, and none of them knew anything about a 
birthday party. 
(Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 3506, Ls. 5-14 (balding original).) 
"[L]ay opinion testimony is admissible if it is rationally based on the 
perception of the witness, helpful to the determination of a fact in issue, and not 
based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge." State v. Salazar, 
153 Idaho 24, 26, 278 P.3d 426, 428 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing I.RE. 701 ). Issues 
of what weight to give the opinion do not go to admissibility but are for the jury. 
Almaraz, 154 Idaho at _, 301 P.3d at 260. Error in admission of such 
evidence will only be found where there has been a clear abuse of discretion. kl 
Idaho courts have properly allowed lay opinion testimony that the person in 
surveillance video was the defendant, Salazar, 153 Idaho at 26-27, 278 P.3d at 
428-29; that an accident caused developmental digression of a toddler, Carrillo v. 
Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 750 n.3, 274 P.3d 1256, 1265 n.3 (2012); and 
that the defendant took a "shooter's crouch" just before the death of the victim, 
Almaraz, 154 Idaho at_, 301 P.3d at 260. 
All three elements of the test are met in this case. Whether the claim that 
R.M. had attended a birthday party was consistent with the evidence and 
information known to the witness was a matter within the witness' perception; it 
was helpful for the jury to know that those who had been sent out to look for R.M. 
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found circumstances indicating they had been sent on a wild goose chase; and 
the experience of those initially searching for RM. was not a matter of expertise. 
Thus, the district court was within its discretion to overrule Ehrlick's "expert 
opinion" objection and admit the evidence. 
Ehrlick contends that the evidence "was not helpful to the determination of 
any fact in issue" because whether there was a birthday party "is, in and of itself, 
irrelevant." (Appellant's brief, p. 70.7) This argument misses the point. The state 
was not trying to prove there was no birthday party "in and of itself," it was trying 
to prove that Ehrlick sent police and dozens of volunteers on a meaningless and 
futile search for RM. to hide the fact R.M. was already dead and Ehrlick knew 
this. That Ehrlick's claim R.M. had gone to a birthday party made no sense in 
light of the circumstances, including what was discovered during the search, was 
one piece of the evidence establishing this. 8 
Finally, even if the lay opinion evidence was improperly admitted any error 
was necessarily harmless given the overwhelming unchallenged evidence that 
those who searched for RM. found no evidence to support Ehrlick's statement 
7 In the initial 9-1-1 call Ehrlick stated, "Everybody keeps directing me to the-a 
birthday party." (State's Exhibit 12-1T (p. 3, Ls. 1-2) (EhrlickEX.pdf, p. 69).) He 
told the responding officer, "There was a birthday party. He kept saying, "I want 
to go to the birthday party.' I kept telling him, "No, no, no. No birthday. You can't 
go to the birthday party."' (State's Exhibit 12-2T (EhrlickEX.pdf, p. 76).) It is the 
second version of events that Ehrlick relies on for the argument that whether 
there actually was a birthday party is irrelevant. 
8 Other pieces included Ehrlick's lackadaisical approach to looking for RM. and 
lack of appropriate emotional responses, also established by lay witnesses. 
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R.M. had gone to a birthday party. Ehrlick's argument that the absence of one 
person's opinion that Ehrlick's insistence that R.M. had gone to a birthday party 
made little sense under the circumstances "devastates the State's weak and 
circumstantial case" (Appellant's brief, p. 72) is, at best, hyperbolic. 
VII. 
Ehrlick Has Shown No Error In The Exclusion Of Hearsay Evidence 
A. Introduction 
During cross examination of Officer Matthew Brechwald, counsel for 
Ehrlick tried to inquire about what two persons had told the officer. (Trial Tr., vol. 
11, p. 4895, L. 13 - p. 4897, L. 5.) Specifically, counsel wanted to elicit evidence 
that D.T. "said he had played with [R.M.]." (Trial Tr., p. 4907, Ls. 19-259) and that 
seven-year-old K.D. said she "played with [R.M.] on the swing" and also reported 
overhearing talk of a birthday party near the pool (Trial Tr., vol. 11, p. 4908, Ls. 1-
8). The evidence was offered to "impeach[] or rebut[]" the "inference" that 
Ehrlick's statements about "[R.M.]'s location and his activities on the 24th were 
false" and was therefore "not offered for the truth" of the matters asserted. (Trial 
Tr., vol. II, p. 4908, Ls. 9-23.) Instead, the evidence was offered to show "why 
the defendants [sic] are telling law enforcement that people did see him; that 
there was a birthday party." (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 4910, L. 21 - p. 4911, L. 25.) 
9 The evidence established that D.T. could not have been referring to the day 
R.M. disappeared because D.T. was at his father's house that day. (Trial Tr., vol. 
I, p. 2285, L. 3 - p. 2287, L. 15; p. 2295, Ls. 9-23; p. 2304, Ls. 5-20; p. 2315, L. 9 
- p. 2316, L. 3; p. 2322, Ls. 1-7; vol. II, p. 4895, Ls. 13-19.) 
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The state responded by arguing that the proffered testimony of the officer 
about what the two other people said was hearsay. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 4912, L. 2 
- p. 4913, L. 23.) The proffer of the evidence to show that Ehrlick was telling 
officers what others said was not viable because the officer was only going to be 
asked what people told the officer, not what other people told Ehrlick, which he 
then provided to police. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 4913, L. 24 - p. 4914, L. 17.) The 
court held that Ehrlick's counsel could ask the officer about any leads or sightings 
of R.M. that Ehrlick called to the officer's attention, but that he could not present 
evidence of out-of-court statements, which would be relevant only to "show that 
[R.M.] was playing with somebody at the swing that day." (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 
4918, L. 22 - p. 4919, L. 9; see also p. 4921, L. 15 -p. 4924, L. 16.) 
On appeal Ehrlick does not dispute the ruling that evidence of what D.T. 
and K.D. told the officer about playing with R.M. that day is inadmissible, but 
does claim evidence that K.D. told Officer Brechwald she heard talk about a 
birthday party was admissible. (Appellant's brief, pp. 73-74.) Officer Brechwald's 
proposed testimony that K. D. told him about what others said about a birthday 
party "was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted" but merely to 
"demonstrate that Mr. Ehrlick was not the only person who spoke about a 
birthday party." (Appellant's brief, p. 74.) This, Ehrlick argues, "rebuts the state's 
assertion that Mr. Ehrlick was the sole source of information about there being 
talk of a birthday party" and tends to show that R.M. did, in fact, ask Ehrlick to go 
to a birthday party. (Appellant's brief, p. 74.) Ehrlick's argument is without merit 
because evidence of K.D.'s out-of-court statement to Officer Brechwald that other 
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people were talking about a birthday party, offered to prove that other people 
were talking about a birthday party, plainly relies upon the truth of K.D.'s out-of-
court statement. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard for review of rulings admitting or excluding hearsay is set 
forth in section VI. B., above. 
C. Evidence Of K.D.'s Statements To Officer Brechwald That Other People 
Were Talking About A Party, Offered To Prove That Other People Were 
Talking About A Party, Was Properly Excluded As Inadmissible Hearsay 
Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted.'' I.RE. 801 (c). Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible. 
I.R.E. 802. Ehrlick's offer of proof was that Officer Brechwald would testify that 
K.D. told him she "was at the hot tub or pool area" and heard "talk of a birthday 
party.'' (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 4908, Ls. 1-8.) This evidence was double hearsay: 
K. D. 's out-of-court statement to Officer Brechwald and the out-of-court 
statements by unknown other people she reported hearing. Thus, both layers of 
hearsay had to be exempt from the prohibition on hearsay evidence. See State 
v. Vivian, 129 Idaho 375, 378, 924 P.2d 637, 640 (Ct. App. 1996) (statement in 
document was double hearsay, and therefore both statement itself and the 
document the statement was in must be admissible under hearsay exceptions). 
Because any purpose the evidence could have been admitted for relied either on 
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the truth of K. D.'s statement or the truth of the statement she reported hearing, 
the evidence was of necessity offered for the truth of the matter asserted. 
On appeal Ehrlick argues that the evidence "was not offered for the truth 
of the matter asserted" but instead "to demonstrate that Mr. Ehrlick was not the 
only person who spoke about a birthday party," which "rebut[s] the state's 
premise that Mr. Ehrlick was the only person who said that there was a birthday 
party." (Appellant's brief, p. 74.) Proving that persons other than K.D. were 
talking about a birthday party relies directly on the truth of K.D.'s out-of-court 
statement, however. The jury would have to believe that K.D. accurately and 
truthfully reported to Officer Brechwald about hearing other people talk about a 
birthday party. Ehrlick's argument that proving other people talked about the 
birthday party does not rely upon the truth of K.D.'s out-of-court statement that 
she heard other people talk about a birthday party, and was therefore not 
hearsay, is without merit. 
D. Any Error Was Harmless 
Any error in excluding evidence that seven-year-old K.D. told a police 
officer she heard other people talking about a birthday party was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no evidence that R.M. was present and 
therefore heard the talk about a birthday party, no evidence that the people 
talking about a birthday party were talking about a birthday party that day, or that 
such talk at the pool was in any way related to Ehrlick's initial report that R.M. 
had in fact gone to a birthday party that day. That unknown people mentioned a 
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birthday party in an unknown context is so minimally probative that any error in 
its exclusion is necessarily harmless. 
VIII. 
Ehrlick Has Shown No Error In The Admission Of Evidence A Custody Order 
Prohibited Him From Being Alone With Jenkins' Daughter R.A. To Impeach 
Ehrlick's Testimony That He Had Been The Primary Caregiver For R.A. While 
Jenkins Worked 
A. Introduction 
In direct examination Ehrlick testified that Melissa Jenkins' daughter, R.A., 
lived with Jenkins and him. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 5899, L. 8 - p. 5900, L. 16; p. 
5923, Ls. 12-25.) He testified he was the primary caregiver for Melissa's three 
children, R.M., R.A. and A.E., when she was at work in 2008. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 
5901, L. 21 - p. 5903, L. 11.) After the Department of Health and Welfare 
intervened because of an injury to A.E., R.A. "went back to her father." (Trial Tr., 
vol. II, p. 5924, L. 1 - p. 5927, L. 11.) There were no children in the home for 
several months, before A.E. was returned by the state and then R.M. came to 
live with them for the summer. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 5935, L. 4 - p. 5936, L. 25.) 
In cross-examination the prosecutor asked questions about Ehrlick's claim 
he was the primary caregiver for R.A. in 2008. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6038, L. 23 -
p. 6039, L. 12.) When the prosecutor started asking about terms of a January 
2008 custody order prohibiting Ehrlick from being alone with R.A., Ehrlick's 
counsel objected and the matter was taken up outside the presence of the jury. 
(Trial Tr. vol. II, p. 6039, L. 13 - p. 6041, L. 13.) The prosecutor offered the 
evidence to challenge the credibility of Ehrlick's testimony that he had watched 
R.A. nearly daily for the months that he had claimed. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6041, L. 
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14 - p. 6043, L. 21.) Despite Ehrlick's counsel's representations that Ehrlick's 
testimony was just to show "who was in the house" in the 18 months before R.M. 
was killed, the district court concluded the evidence was presented to show 
Ehrlick was a "good father" and "took good care of the children." (Trial Tr., vol. II, 
p. 6044, L. 1 - p. 6045, L. 5.) The district court ruled that the prosecution could 
ask him whether he was aware there was a court order prohibiting him from 
having contact with R.A. at the time he testified he was caring for her. (Trial Tr., 
p. 6046, Ls. 7-10.) 
When asked, Ehrlick denied any knowledge of the order, but read three 
parts of that order at the prosecution's request: (1) that he was prohibited from 
being alone with R.A.; (2) that R.A.'s birthday was November 30 (not March 2 as 
he had previously testified); and (3) that Jenkins' sister Trish was a person 
authorized to care for R.A.. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6050, L. 15 - p. 6051, L. 22; see 
also Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6026, Ls. 2-8.) The court also allowed admission of the 
custody order. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6052, L. 14 - p. 6053, L. 25.) Shortly 
thereafter, before publication, the trial court reversed its decision and ruled that, 
because evidence regarding the contents of the order was admitted solely for 
impeachment, the exhibit would not be admitted and the exhibit was withdrawn. 
(Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6132, L. 3-p. 6134, L. 21.) 
On appeal Ehrlick asserts that "the district court erred in temporarily 
admitting the custody agreement [sic) and allowing related questioning because it 
[sic) was not relevant." (Appellant's brief, p. 76.) Ehrlick's assertion that 
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evidence of a court order prohibiting him from being alone with R.A. did not tend 
to impeach his testimony that he was her primary caregiver is without merit. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Relevance of evidence is reviewed de novo. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 
259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996); State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 632, 945 
P.2d 1, 3 (1997); State v. MacDonald, 131 Idaho 367, 956 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 
1998). Impeachment evidence, going to credibility, is always relevant. State v. 
Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 503, 988 P.2d 1170, 1177 (1999) (quoting State v. 
Arledge, 119 Idaho 584, 588, 808 P.2d 1329, 1333 (Ct. App. 1991)). See also 
State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 540, 285 P.3d 348, 355 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(evidence going to credibility is relevant). 
Whether the probative value of evidence is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice under I.R.E. 403 is a discretionary matter that will 
be disturbed on appeal only if the appellant demonstrates that the district court 
abused its discretion. State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 406, 807 P.2d 610, 624 
(1991); State v. Birkla, 126 Idaho 498, 500, 887 P.2d 43, 45 (Ct. App. 1994). 
C. Evidence That A Court Order Prohibited Ehrlick From Being Alone With 
R.A. Impeaches Ehrlick's Testimony He Was Her Primary Caregiver 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable." I. R. E. 401. The credibility of a witness is a fact of consequence, 
so impeachment evidence is always relevant. Hairston, 133 Idaho at 503, 988 
P.2d at 1177 (quoting Arledge, 119 Idaho at 588, 808 P.2d at 1333). 
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Impeachment evidence is evidence "designed to discredit a witness, i.e. to 
reduce the effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth the evidence which 
explains why the jury should not put faith in his testimony." State v. Hayes, 144 
Idaho 574, 578, 165 P.3d 288, 292 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting State v. Marsh, 141 
Idaho 862, 868-69, 119 P.3d 637, 643-44 (Ct. App. 2004).) The existence of a 
custody order prohibiting leaving R.A. alone with Ehrlick impeached the 
testimony that he was R.A.'s primary caregiver and the inference that he 
provided good care for R.A. 10 
Ehrlick claims that lack of proof that he "had any knowledge of the custody 
agreement [sic]" rendered the custody order irrelevant. (Appellant's brief, pp. 76-
77.) Ehrlick provides no analysis for this claim. Presumably he is contending 
that his claimed lack of knowledge that he was violating the order means that 
there is no tendency for the evidence to show that he was not in fact watching 
R.A. as claimed. However, the evidence showed that he had a long-term 
domestic relationship with R.A.'s mother, suggesting that he would be aware of 
custody conditions (his contrary claims notwithstanding). In addition, there was 
evidence that Ehrlick and Jenkins in fact made arrangements for R.A. to be 
babysat by a neighbor when Jenkins was at work. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 2018, Ls. 
14-25; p. 2022, Ls. 14-23; p. 2046, L. 16 - p. 2047, L. 14.) This arrangement 
10 Ehrlick also argues it was error to not preliminarily hold that the exhibit was 
inadmissible. Because the exhibit was never actually presented to the jury, this 
is analogous to a court making an incorrect pre-trial ruling corrected before trial. 
Because it is the ruling that actually allows the jury to see the evidence or not see 
the evidence that matters legally and factually, there was no error in the 
preliminary ruling where the exhibit was ultimately excluded and not presented to 
the jury. 
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strongly suggests knowledge that Ehrlick could not be R.A.'s caregiver. Even if 
Ehrlick's claim of ignorance were credible, ignorance of custody conditions of his 
girlfriend's children, like ignorance of R.A.'s birthday, is itself impeaching of 
Ehrlick's implied and direct claims of being a loving care provider to those 
children. Either way, the evidence was relevant to explain why the jury should not 
put faith in Ehrlick's testimony. 
Ehrlick next argues the state "failed to prove that Mr. Ehrlick did not watch 
R.A. in the summer of 2008." (Appellant's brief, p. 77.) Impeaching evidence 
need not conclusively prove testimony to be false, however, but merely have 
"some tendency" to show it to be false or unreliable. Ehrlick's argument is 
directly contrary to the applicable legal standard. 
Ehrlick next argues that "whether or not R.A. was left in his custody during 
the summer of 2008 is not an issue of any consequence to the ultimate question 
at trial." (Appellant's brief, p. 77.) Ehrlick testified at trial that he was the primary 
caregiver of R.A. in the spring and summer of 2008. Ehrlick has cited no 
authority that a witness may testify about facts, but then avoid impeachment on 
that testimony by claiming that the previously given testimony was irrelevant. 
This argument is also contrary to the applicable legal standards making 
impeachment "always" relevant. Hairston, 133 Idaho at 503, 988 P.2d at 1177; 
Arledge, 119 Idaho at 588, 808 P.2d at 1333; Thumm, 153 Idaho at 540, 285 
P.3d at 355. 
Finally Ehrlick argues that evidence of the custody order "does not prove 
anything related to the children's care" because there are "numerous reasons" 
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parents may limit care by a step-parent. (Appellant's brief, p. 77.) This argument 
that the evidence must "prove" the testimony wrong to be admissible is, as noted 
above, directly contrary to the relevance standard of having "any tendency" to 
make a fact more or less likely. The mere existence of "many reasons" for the 
order did not render it without "any tendency" to impeach Ehrlick's testimony. 
Ehrlick is again inviting this Court to apply a standard incompatible with the 
correct one. 
Ehrlick's arguments are generally incompatible with the standards that 
must be applied by this Court. The evidence that the custody order prohibited 
the very actions Ehrlick testified he undertook impeached both his express claim 
he was in fact the caretaker of R.A. and the implied assertion that he was a good 
caretaker for the child. The evidence was therefore relevant for impeachment 
and properly admitted. Ehrlick has failed to show error by the district court. 
D. Ehrlick Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In Weighing The 
Potential For Unfair Prejudice 
Pursuant to I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the 
district court's discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice-which is the tendency to 
suggest a decision on an improper basis-substantially outweighs the probative 
value of the evidence. Ruiz, 150 Idaho at 471, 248 P.3d at 722; Floyd, 125 Idaho 
at 654, 873 P.2d at 907; Nichols, 124 Idaho at 656, 862 P.2d at 348. "Under the 
rule, the evidence is only excluded if the probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The rule suggests a strong 
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preference for admissibility of relevant evidence." Martin, 118 Idaho at 340 n.3, 
796 P.2d at 1013 n.3 (emphasis in original). 
Ehrlick argues the potential for unfair prejudice was that the jury could 
"speculate that Mr. Ehrlick was presenting a grave danger" to R.A., the 
"prejudicial effect" of which is "glaringly obvious." (Appellant's brief, p. 77.) Of 
course if the court in the custody case concluded that Ehrlick was a "grave 
danger" to a small child, the order would not have been to merely not leave the 
child alone with Ehrlick. The argument that the jury could reach an irrational 
conclusion not supported by the evidence is not, however, unfair prejudice under 
this rule. As set forth above, unfair prejudice is having a tendency to suggest a 
decision on an improper basis. 11 Ehrlick has failed to show that ungrounded 
fears the jury might irrationally draw unwarranted conclusions, to the extent such 
was a risk in relation to this evidence, simply does not rise to the level of 
substantially outweighing the probative value of this evidence. 
E. If Error, It Was Harmless 
If there was any error in the admission of evidence regarding the custody 
order, it was necessarily harmless. As stated above, the possibility that the jury 
concluded Ehrlick was a "grave risk" to R.A., and therefore had killed R.M., on 
the basis of the few questions on this issue in cross-examination is not plausible. 
If the jury concluded that Ehrlick was a "grave risk" to anyone it was on the 
overwhelming evidence that he brutally battered eight-year-old R.M. to death. 
11 The possibility of jury confusion is the closest the rule gets to supporting 
Ehrlick's argument. I.RE. 403. Such was not the objection below, however. 
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IX. 
Ehrlick Has Failed To Show Error In The Prosecutor's Argument That Ehrlick 
Had Lied About Several Things Both To The Police And On The Stand 
A. Introduction 
During closing arguments the prosecutor stated that Ehrlick had "lied 
about a lot of things" to detectives and on the witness stand, but they could 
believe his statement to police that he had put his knees on R.M.'s stomach while 
R.M. was laying on the floor and had put his full 277 pound weight on R.M. as a 
form of discipline. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6244, L. 13 - p. 6247, L. 10.) The defense 
stated no objection to this argument. (Id.) 
Quite a bit later in his argument the prosecutor addressed the several 
statements Ehrlick made about when R.M. went missing. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 
6273, L. 21 - p. 6278, L. 22.) One aspect of the argument was that Ehrlick failed 
to tell his father, Daniel Ehrlick, Sr., in an 8:26 phone call, that R.M. was missing, 
even though he made several subsequent statements claiming that R.M. was 
missing well before that time. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6278, Ls. 2-6.) The prosecutor 
pointed out that Ehrlick claimed his father was lying about what was said in that 
phone call, but argued that the father was more credible because Ehrlick was the 
one "with the motivations to lie" and "wasn't truthful on the witness stand." (Trial 
Tr., vol. II, p. 6278, Ls. 7-12.) Again, there was no objection to this argument. 
Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor specifically addressed "some of the lies 
that [Ehrlick has been] telling both the court and, previously, with [sic] the 
investigators." (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6278, Ls. 23-25.) The prosecutor argued 
Ehrlick's claim that R.M. had been in Dr. Shaffer's office was proven to be false 
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by a witness from that office, which was significant because "you don't take an 
abused and a battered and a tortured boy in to a pediatrician's office" and that 
lying about that fact was unnecessary if Ehrlick was not involved in "[R.M.)'s 
murder and disappearance." (Trial Tr., vol., II, p. 6279, Ls. 6-14.) The defense 
did not object to this argument. 
The prosecutor next argued Ehrlick's claim that R.M. spent time at a 
neighbor's the summer of his disappearance was not true based on the 
neighbor's testimony. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6279, Ls. 15-18.) Ehrlick did not 
object. 
The prosecutor argued that Ehrlick's statements that Melissa Jenkins had 
been staying with other people because she was not supposed to be in the 
apartment were not true, and asked why Ehrlick "need[ed] to lie to investigators?" 
(Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6279, Ls. 19-23.) This argument did not draw an objection. 
The prosecutor also argued that Ehrlick told investigators things that were 
not true when he claimed he had a good relationship with R.M., that R.M. had 
recently been to New Plymouth, and that "Chris Phillips was the one who pointed 
me to a birthday party"; and asked the jury to consider why, if he had nothing to 
hide, was Ehrlick "telling so many untruths to investigators." (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 
6279, L. 24 - p. 6280, L. 8.) Again, this argument was presented without 
objection. 
The prosecutor then invited the jury to consider the credibility of Ehrlick 
against the witnesses that Ehrlick accused of lying: FBI Agent Blevins, Lenora 
Porter, Dan Ehrlick, Sr., David Ehrlick, and Robbyn Ehrlick. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 
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6280, L. 9 - p. 6281, L. 6.) The prosecutor argued that the "reality" was that it 
was Ehrlick, and not all these other witnesses, "who was dishonest during his 
testimony." (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6281, Ls. 7-8.) That dishonesty was "relevant" 
both to making credibility determinations and to "determining what's going on," 
the latter because Ehrlick would not have a need to lie to investigators and in his 
testimony if he had "nothing to hide." (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6281, Ls. 8-15.) At that 
point defense counsel objected, saying it was improper "to call the defendant a 
liar." (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6281, Ls. 16-19.) The prosecutor denied having called 
Ehrlick a liar, stating that he was "talking about specific lies that Mr. Ehrlick told," 
but stated that he would "try to use a different word." (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6281, 
Ls. 19-22.) 
The prosecutor then commenced an argument that Ehrlick was 
"dishonest" when he testified and defense counsel again objected, saying it was 
not proper to "comment that the defendant was dishonest" and that he "can't call 
the witness a liar." (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6281, L. 24 - p. 6282, L. 7.) The 
prosecutor responded by contending he was allowed to call attention to the 
comparisons with other witness' testimony, Ehrlick's actual admissions to lying, 
and the inferences from Ehrlick's repeated changes in his story. (Trial Tr., vol. II, 
p. 6282, Ls. 8-20.) The court instructed the jury that the arguments of counsel 
were not evidence and that the jury was to "determine the credibility of the 
individuals who have testified." (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6282, Ls. 21-25.) 
56 
Thereafter the prosecutor argued that the evidence demonstrated that 
several of Ehrlick's other statements, before trial and while on the witness stand, 
were shown to be untrue by the evidence. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6283, Ls. 2-18.) 
On appeal Ehrlick contends the district court erred by not sustaining his 
objection because the prosecutor "did not merely present conflicting evidence 
and ask the jury to draw its own conclusions," but instead "told the jury the 
conclusions they [sic] must reach" because they were "the conclusions the 
trustworthy, righteous prosecution had reached." (Appellant's brief, p. 82.) 
Ehrlick's appellate argument that the prosecutor invoked his own 
"trustworth[iness]" or "righteous[ness]" in argument is false. Likewise, his claim 
that an attorney may not "[tell] the jury the conclusions they [sic] must reach" is 
incorrect as a matter of law. Ehrlick has therefore failed to show error by the trial 
court in regard to his objection below. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A defendant is not entitled to relief based upon a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct unless he can establish two things: (1) the complained of conduct 
was improper; and (2) the improper conduct prejudiced him. State v. Romero-
Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 202, 75 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Ct. App. 2003). Even after a 
finding of prosecutorial misconduct, a conviction will not be set aside for small 
errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the results of 
the trial. See State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359, 367-68, 972 P.2d 737, 745-46 (Ct. 
App. 1998). "The right to due process does not guarantee a defendant an error-
free trial but a fair one." State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445,451,816 P.2d 1002, 
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1008 (Ct. App. 1991 ). Similarly, the function of appellate review is "not to 
discipline the prosecutor for misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct 
did not interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial." l!l If the jury would 
have reached the same result had the prosecutor's error not occurred, the error 
is deemed harmless. l!l 
C. The Prosecutor's Argument That The Evidence Established Many Of 
Ehrlick's Statements To Be Lies Was Proper 
A prosecutor has "considerable latitude in closing argument" and is 
"entitled to discuss fully .. . the evidence and the inferences to be drawn 
therefrom." State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 18, 189 P.3d 477,480 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(citing Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969). "This includes the right to 
express how, from [the prosecutor's] perspective, the evidence confirms or calls 
into doubt the credibility of particular witnesses." State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14, 
909 P.2d 624, 632 (Ct. App. 1996). A prosecutor may not "express a personal 
belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence," id., or use 
"inflammatory words" to "describe the defendant," Gross, 146 Idaho at 18, 189 
P.3d at 480 (excessively calling the defendant a "liar" may be misconduct). 
The transcript shows the prosecutor merely contended that the evidence 
at trial showed that Ehrlick lied about many things. The prosecutor did not call 
Ehrlick a "liar" or use other "inflammatory words" to describe the defendant, but 
instead strictly confined his arguments to commentary about the falsity of the 
statements themselves. Nor is there any hint in the prosecutor's comments that 
he was basing his argument in any way on matters outside the evidence such as 
his personal trustworthiness or righteousness. 
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Ehrlick argues that the prosecutor's arguments were "more than a fair 
comment on the evidence" and were instead "attempts to characterize Mr. Ehrlick 
as . . . a liar." (Appellant's brief, p. 82.) Pointing out that the evidence 
demonstrates that Ehrlick told dozens of lies will, quite naturally, lead to the 
inference that he is a liar. That this is a natural inference from the evidence does 
not make the prosecutor's argument, in which he never accused Ehrlick of being 
a liar, improper. Ehrlick does not assert that the prosecutor's argument as to any 
single statement being a lie was not supported by the evidence. That taking all 
of the lies cumulatively strongly suggests that Ehrlick is a liar does not mean that 
the prosecutor must avoid talking about Ehrlick's false statements. The law 
prohibits an inflammatory argument, in the sense of an argument that is unfairly 
prejudicial. An argument that the defendant told many, many lies, when that 
argument is supported by the evidence, is in no way inflammatory, even if it is 
damning. 
Ehrlick next asserts that the prosecutor's arguments were not based on 
the evidence but were instead based on "opinions" and were merely the 
"conclusions the trustworthy, righteous prosecution had reached." (Appellant's 
brief, p. 82.) This appellate claim is simply, and absolutely, false. No fair or 
reasonable reading of the transcript of the argument can lead to the conclusion 
that the prosecutor's argument was not based on the evidence. Ehrlick has 
failed to show error by the district court in declining to sustain Ehrlick's objection. 
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X. 
Ehrlick Has Shown No Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor's Closing Argument 
A. Introduction 
Ehrlick also makes several claims of fundamental error in relation to 
issues not preserved for appellate review. (Appellant's brief, pp. 82-90.) 
Specifically, Ehrlick claims the prosecutor used the word "torture" in relation to 
actions that did not meet the legal definition of torture (Appellant's brief, pp. 82-
87); mischaracterized his admissions to the police (Appellant's brief, pp. 87-88); 
and used evidence admitted for a limited purpose for an improper purpose 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 88-89). All of these arguments are disproved by the record 
or the law. Ehrlick has failed to show any reasonable claim of error, much less a 
viable claim of fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A claim of error unpreserved for appellate review by a timely objection 
may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes fundamental error." State v. 
Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010). In the 
absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to remedy that error is 
strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being 
deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a 
fair tribunal." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). 
Review without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that 
"one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated;" (2) 
the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record, "without the need for 
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any additional information" including information "as to whether the failure to 
object was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must demonstrate that the 
error affected the defendant's substantial rights," generally by showing a 
reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the trial court 
proceedings." kt at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
C. Ehrlick Has Failed To Show That The Prosecutor's Arguments Were 
Erroneous, Much Less That The Claimed Impropriety Was Clear Error On 
The Record That Caused Him Prejudice 
"[IJt is not enough that the prosecutors' remarks were undesirable or even 
universally condemned. The relevant question is whether the prosecutors' 
comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction 
a denial of due process." Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 
209, 219 (1982) ("[TJhe touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the 
prosecutor."); State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d 1002, 1008 (Ct. 
App. 1991) (the function of appellate review is "not to discipline the prosecutor for 
misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not interfere with the 
defendant's right to a fair trial"). Ehrlick's claims that the prosecutors breached 
this standard in closing argument are facially without merit. 
1. Ehrlick's Claim That The Prosecutor Made An Improper Argument 
By Talking About Evidence Admitted Without Objection Is Specious 
During the trial the state called Dr. Allen Keller, a practicing physician and 
professor of medicine at NYU whose practice specializes in treating victims of 
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torture and human rights abuses. (Trial Tr., vol. 11, p. 5077, L. 5 - p. 5092, L. 7.) 
Dr. Keller testified that the international definition of torture would be "severe 
physical or mental suffering" for "punishment, intimidation, [or] attempts at 
eliciting information" inflicted by someone in an "official capacity." (Trial Tr., vol. 
II, p. 5093, Ls. 14-23.) Dr. Keller testified the Idaho definition of torture related to 
torture-murder does not require any official governmental capacity. (Trial Tr., vol. 
II, p. 5093, L. 24 - p. 5096, L. 3.) 
Dr. Keller testified that torture is not merely physical, but involves 
psychological and social components. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 5096, L. 15 - p. 5099, 
L. 4.) Torture "rarely, if ever" involves only physical infliction of severe pain, but 
generally involves other forms of abuse. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 5099, Ls. 5-11.) 
Examples of psychological torture include mock executions to cause terror and 
sexual humiliations, dehumanization, the threat of physical torture, and creating 
the "illusion of choice," all of which break down the individual's sense of control. 
(Trial Tr., vol. 11, p. 5099, L. 12 - p. 5103, L. 5.) 
In relation to the specifics of this case, Dr. Keller testified that Ehrlick's use 
of "dead bugging" (having R.M. lie on his back and put his arms and legs straight 
up) was what is "referred to as a stress position, where it's very painful and, 
frankly, not possible to maintain that position for a prolonged extended period." 
(Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 5105, L. 22 - p. 5107, L. 5.) The "physical component" was 
"musculoskeletal pain," while the psychological component was knowing that the 
position cannot be maintained, and once not maintained that he would be 
punished by Ehrlick putting or dropping his weight onto R.M.'s trunk. (Trial Tr., 
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vol. II, p. 5107, L. 5-p. 5108, L. 6; p. 5117, L.1-p. 5118, L. 10.) Another stress 
position inflicted on R.M. by Ehrlick was "the chair" (supporting his weight with 
bended legs while the back is pressed against a wall) that likewise caused 
"discomfort" turning to pain in that it was physically impossible to maintain that 
position for any length of time and "terror" from knowing there would be 
punishment for not maintaining the position. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 5108, L. 7 - p. 
5110, L. 1.) Another version of this technique, called "the wall" by Ehrlick, 
involved R.M. kneeling, putting his arms behind his back, bowing his head, and 
leaning forward into a wall so part of his weight is supported by his neck, and 
also generated discomfort and pain as well as humiliation and loss of control. 
(Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 5123, L. 5 - p. 5124, L. 24.) Ehrlick would give R.M. the 
illusion of choice by letting him pick the form of infliction of pain, an established 
method of "torture and abuse." (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 5110, L. 2 - p. 5111, L. 22.) 
Other forms of torture Ehrlick admitted to included isolation, humiliation, forcing 
R.M. to eat food that induced vomiting, hitting him with a board, verbal derision 
and abuse, and punishments for asking for water or use of the bathroom. (Trial 
Tr., p. 5112, L. 8 - p. 5116, L. 20; p. 5118, L. 11 - p. 5123, L. 4; p. 5125, L. 3 - p. 
5127, L. 10.) 
Dr. Keller described some of the physical, but especially the psychological 
effects of torture. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 5127, L. 4 - p. 5131, L. 15.) R.M. 
demonstrated many of the changes in demeanor associated with having been 
tortured. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 5131, L. 16 - p. 5132, L. 16.) Dr. Keller also talked 
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about some of the circumstances and justifications that lead someone to torture 
another. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 5132, L. 20 - p. 5139, L. 1.) 
In closing argument the prosecutor argued, based in large part upon the 
testimony of Dr. Keller, that Ehrlick had admitted in police interviews to a course 
of conduct in inflicting physical and psychological harm on R.M. that rose to the 
level of torture and, eventually, the injuries that caused R.M.'s death. (Trial Tr., 
vol. II, p. 6224, L. 14 - p. 6248, L. 17; p. 6313, L. 20 - p. 6339, L. 14.) 
On appeal Ehrlick asserts that Dr. Keller's testimony was inadmissible but 
acknowledges that its admission was not fundamental error. (Appellant's brief, p. 
83, n.22.) He argues that the prosecutor's reliance on that admitted testimony in 
closing argument was fundamental error. (Appellant's brief, pp. 83-87. 12) He 
cites no case holding, or even hinting, that a prosecutor may not reference or 
even rely on admitted evidence in closing argument, however. He has therefore 
failed to support his argument with legal authority. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 
259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (arguments unsupported by authority "will 
not be considered" on appeal). Ehrlick has failed to articulate, much less 
demonstrate, how reliance on admitted evidence in closing argument constituted 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
Even if Ehrlick's argument invoked a constitutional right to have the 
prosecutor ignore admitted evidence in closing argument, he has failed to show 
12 Throughout his brief Ehrlick seriously understates the nature of the abusive 
conduct that did not directly result in injury to R.M. For example, he 
characterizes keeping R.M. alone and silent in a closet for an hour or more at a 
time as "sitting in a walk-in closet," and forcing him to eat a food that caused him 
to vomit as making him eat his "least favorite food." (Appellant's brief, p. 85.) 
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clear error on the record. Ehrlick's only basis for claiming that Dr. Keller's 
testimony was inadmissible is because Dr. Keller did not use the Idaho Code 
definition of "torture" (Appellant's brief, p. 83), followed by the declaration 
(unaccompanied by citation to law) that his testimony therefore "could not assist 
the jury" (Appellant's brief, p. 83 n.22). It is hardly uncommon, however, for 
experts to use terms that, within their fields of expertise, have different definitions 
or meanings than provided in the law. Ehrlick has provided no authority that 
such alone renders the expert's testimony inadmissible, much less that argument 
based on such testimony is a violation of due process. 
To the contrary, the testimony was admissible and argument based 
thereon proper. "To be admissible, the expert's testimony must assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." State v. Joslin, 
145 Idaho 75, 81, 175 P.3d 764, 770 (2007) (quotations omitted); see also I.RE. 
702. "The function of the expert is to provide testimony on subjects that are 
beyond the common sense, experience and education of the average juror." 
State v. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 42, 966 P.2d 33, 42 (Ct. App. 1998) (citations 
omitted). That Ehrlick's acts causing mental and social suffering, but not 
necessarily physical harm, constituted components of torture (under the definition 
given by the expert) assisted the jury to understand that Ehrlick was not engaged 
in discipline of R.M. that had merely gotten excessive, but rather that he had the 
"intent to cause suffering" or was acting "to satisfy some sadistic inclination." I.C. 
§ 18-4001. The testimony was admissible, and the state's reliance on the 
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testimony proper. Ehrlick has failed to show error, much less "clear or obvious" 
constitutional error. 
Finally, Ehrlick has failed to show prejudice. 13 Dr. Keller's testimony made 
clear that he, in his capacity as an expert, was using a definition of torture 
different from the definition found in the Idaho Code. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 5093, L. 
9 - p. 5096, L. 3.) The jury was instructed on what constituted torture for 
purposes of torture murder. (R., p. 1216.) "We presume that the jury followed 
the jury instructions given by the trial court in reaching its verdict." State v. 
Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 718, 264 P.3d 54, 59 (2011) (citation omitted). There is 
no reason on this record to believe that the jury was either confused as to the 
legal definition of torture or that it disregarded the instruction as to that definition. 
Ehrlick argues the prosecutor "encouraged the jury to disregard the 
definition of torture" in the instructions. (Appellant's brief, p. 90.) This claim is 
false because the prosecutor did not encourage the jury, explicitly or implicitly, to 
disregard its instructions by discussing Dr. Keller's testimony. More importantly, 
however, Ehrlick makes no attempt to even argue that the jury in fact did not 
apply the definition of torture provided in the instructions. To accept Ehrlick's 
argument would require this Court to conclude that the jury found that the act or 
13 Ehrlick attempts to cumulate the prejudice analysis of his several fundamental 
error claims. (Appellant's brief, pp. 90-91.) This approach was squarely rejected 
by the Idaho Supreme Court. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 
982 (2010). See also State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 544-45, 285 P.3d 348, 
359-60 (Ct. App. 2012). Ehrlick's reliance on State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 
253 P.3d 727 (2011 ), is misplaced because that case addressed preserved 
claims. Pursuant to Perrv, the prejudice prong of each claim of fundamental 
error must be reviewed independently. 
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actions that "resulted in the death of [R.M.]" (R., p. 1217 (elements of torture 
murder)) was feeding him oatmeal until he vomited, locking him in a closet for an 
hour or more, and dehumanizing him by calling him names. Ehrlick's claim of 
prejudice, like his claim of error, is meritless. 14 
2. The Prosecutor's Assertions That Ehrlick's Admissions Of Certain 
Actions Were Tantamount To An Admission Of Guilt Was Entirely 
Proper Argument 
Ehrlick next contends it was fundamental error for the prosecutor to argue 
that certain admissions by Ehrlick were tantamount to admissions of guilt. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 87-88.) Ehrlick has failed to establish any element of a 
claim of fundamental error. 
The prosecutor argued that Ehrlick admitted "everything you need to know 
to know that he is the one who killed [R.M.]." (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6224, Ls. 14-
17.) Specifically, the prosecutor argued that Ehrlick's admissions supported the 
inference that he caused the fatal injuries in his apartment by putting or dropping 
his knees on R.M. while R.M. was in the "dead-bug" position (on his back with 
legs and arms straight up). (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6224, L. 18 - p. 6225, L. 3; p. 
6244, L. 20 - p. 6248, L. 17.) Although Ehrlick testified he once knelt beside 
R.M. when he was in the dead bug position without putting weight on him (Trial 
Tr., vol. II, p. 6009, L. 23 - p. 6011, L. 1 ), in cross-examination he admitted he 
had in fact knelt on R.M. and put his weight on the child, and denied testifying 
14 In addition, even if Ehrlick could establish prejudice in relation to the jury's 
finding of torture, such would not require vacating the jury's verdict finding Ehrlick 
guilty first degree murder by aggravated battery on a child. (R., pp. 1240-41.) 
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that he had only knelt beside R.M. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6102, L. 12 - p. 6106, L. 
23). Ehrlick admitted to Detective Ayotte that he had knelt on R.M. with sufficient 
force to cause bruising. (State's Exhibit 12-20T (EhrlickEX.pdf, pp. 504-511).) 
R.M.'s body revealed likely fatal abdominal injuries consistent with having 
significant force applied to his torso during an assault. (ti, Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 
1572, L. 22- p. 1573, L. 14; p. 1972, Ls 9-12.) The evidence amply supports the 
prosecutor's argument that Ehrlick admitted to conduct of the sort that likely was 
the cause of R.M.'s abdominal injuries, and therefore his death. 
Ehrlick argues that he did not literally admit "that he caused R.M.'s fatal 
injuries, that the injuries were caused in the apartment, or that he dropped his 
knees on R.M." (Appellant's brief, p. 88.) This argument is irrelevant, however, 
because the prosecutor was free to argue the inferences from Ehrlick's 
admissions. Severson, 147 Idaho at 720, 215 P.3d at 440; State v. Porter, 130 
Idaho 772, 786, 948 P.2d 127, 141 (1997) (citing State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 
110, 594 P.2d 146, 148 (1979)). It did not violate Ehrlick's constitutional rights, 
much less clearly violate his rights, to argue that Ehrlick's admission of having 
injured R.M. by putting his knees and weight on him leads to the inference that 
Ehrlick forcefully dropped his knees onto R.M. while R.M. was trying, and failing, 
to maintain the "dead bug" position, and is the most viable explanation for how 
R.M. suffered multiple injuries to his abdomen that were likely a cause of death. 
The inference that the prosecutor argued for was reasonably drawn from the 
evidence; Ehrlick has failed to show any misrepresentation of the evidence, 
much less one that is clear on the record. 
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Finally, even if Ehrlick's claim did not fail because the prosecutor's 
argument was proper, he has failed to show prejudice. The jury personally 
witnessed Ehrlick's trial testimony and had before it both the recordings and 
transcripts of the interview with police in which he admitted injuring R.M. by 
kneeling on him and putting his weight on him while R.M. was in the "dead bug" 
position. (State's Exhibit 12-20T (EhrlickEX.pdf pp. 474-530); States Exhibit 12-
20A.) It was instructed that the prosecutor's argument was not evidence (R., p. 
1209), and is presumed to have followed that instruction, Pepcorn, 152 Idaho at 
690, 273 P.3d at 1283; Carson, 151 Idaho at 718, 264 P.3d at 59. Ehrlick makes 
no attempt, under the correct legal standard of considering the harm of this 
claimed error alone, to meet his burden of showing that the jury did not follow the 
instructions and accepted any representation by the prosecutor in lieu of 
determining the facts for itself. (Appellant's brief, pp. 90-91.) Ehrlick has 
therefore failed to show prejudice. 
3. Ehrlick's Claim That The Prosecution Argued Evidence For An 
Improper Purpose Is Based On A Misrepresentation Of The Record 
During closing argument, the prosecutor stated several reasons that it was 
unlikely that R.M. was playing outside the day he disappeared, including that 
Ehrlick and Jenkins had spent all summer trying to hide R.M. from Health and 
Welfare and R.M. had suffered "a prior abdominal injury," "was limping," was 
"sick" and "vomiting," and had suffered a "head injury." (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 6296, 
L. 9 - p. 6297, L. 5.) At a different point in the argument, in the context of 
discussing the evidence of torture, the prosecutor listed the injuries R.M. had 
suffered before he died, and included the "compression" injury to R.M.'s 
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abdomen, the head injury, bruising, and "an ankle injury." (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 
6324, Ls. 2-11.) The prosecutor also argued that Ehrlick's initial reports failed to 
mention that RM. was limping, that he had thrown up, and included other 
omissions later mentioned in interviews with the police, which indicated that 
Ehrlick's initial statements were to deflect suspicion and to delay the police in 
finding RM. rather than actually assist them in finding RM. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 
6421, L. 16 - p. 6423, L. 25.) Finally, the prosecutor also argued that Ehrlick's 
admission that RM. was limping was one of the facts showing that Ehrlick's 
claim R.M. was outside playing the day he disappeared was not true. (Trial Tr., 
vol. II, p. 6301, Ls. 6-19.) 
Ehrlick claims arguments that R.M. was limping were misconduct because 
"there was simply no evidence presented that the jury could consider in support 
of this assertion." (Appellant's brief, pp. 88-89.) He does not, however, 
challenge all of the arguments that RM. was limping. (Id.) The second two of 
the four arguments about limping are not challenged on appeal. (See Appellant's 
brief, pp. 88-89.) 
More importantly, there was ample evidence of R.M.'s limp admitted at 
trial, and Ehrlick's claim the only evidence of the limp was admitted for a limited 
purpose and not for its truth does not withstand scrutiny. Detective Quilter 
testified that Ehrlick had told him in an interview that R.M. "had some kind of a 
limp and told me it wasn't a result of the stick." (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 1645, Ls. 4-21; 
see also Exhibits, pp. 417-18.) Although evidence that Detective Quilter 
repeated Jenkins's statements that R.M. had a limp while questioning Ehrlick 
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was not admitted for the truth of Jenkins's statements (Appellant's brief, p. 89 
(citing Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 1650, L. 22 - p. 1651, L. 4)), evidence of Ehrlick's 
admission in response to questioning based on those statements was not limited. 
Further, Ehrlick's father testified that R.M. had a prolonged "hard limp" starting in 
the beginning of summer. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 4641, Ls. 9-24.) It was certainly 
not improper to talk about a limp Ehrlick admitted existed and that another 
witness also testified about. Ehrlick has failed to show any improper argument, 
much less a constitutional violation, clear on the record, and prejudice. 
XI. 
Ehrlick Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error 
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. 
Martinez, 125 Idaho 445,453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate 
to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error. 
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). In addition, 
cumulative error analysis does not include errors neither objected to nor found 
fundamental. Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at 982. Ehrlick last asserts 
that any errors found but deemed harmless should be cumulated to show 
prejudice. (Appellant's brief, pp. 92-93.) There are no errors to cumulate, 
however, for the reasons already expressed in this brief. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of 
conviction. 
DATED this 6th day of September, 013. 
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